Global Power Shifts in the Semiconductor Industry: Analyzing the Roles of the United States, China, and Multinational Corporations Through the Concept of Security Regimes

Main Article Content

Naphakhawat Wanchai

Abstract

The competition between the United States (US) and China, particularly in the realm of technology, where the semiconductor industry is a key factor in global power shifts. Additionally, multinational corporations are crucial components in the competitive dynamics between the US and China. This paper studied changes in power equilibrium in the semiconductor industry based on security regime, while examining the relationship between the semiconductor industry and the US, China, and multinational corporations. Results were that security regimes significantly changed the world balance of power. The economic relationship of global value chains (GVCs) established industrial policy and international industrial regulations, by 1) US economic strategy to maintain industrial capacity and relying on a partnership network; 2) China increasing basic technology research and development (R&D) investment with Chinese MNCs following national policy to maintain industrial capacity; and 3) US and allied MNCs use international cooperation to strengthen industrial capacity. In addition, Chinese MNCs have increasingly penetrated consumer markets in developing nations and Southeast Asia to maintain profitability.

Article Details

How to Cite
Wanchai, N. (2024). Global Power Shifts in the Semiconductor Industry: Analyzing the Roles of the United States, China, and Multinational Corporations Through the Concept of Security Regimes. Graduate Review of Political Science and Public Administration Journal, 3(2), 61–98. retrieved from https://so07.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/GRPSPAJ/article/view/4860
Section
Academic article

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