



วารสารบัณฑิตพิจารณา ด้านรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์

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Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University



วารสารบัณฑิตพิจารณาณ์ด้านรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์

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1. วัตถุประสงค์

(1) เพื่อเป็นแหล่งเผยแพร่ผลงานทางวิชาการของนิสิตและนักศึกษาระดับปริญญาตรี ปริญญาโท และปริญญาเอก รวมถึงผู้สนใจทั่วไป

(2) เพื่อส่งเสริมและกระตุ้นให้เกิดการวิจัย พัฒนาและเผยแพร่องค์ความรู้ด้านสังคมศาสตร์ การเมืองการปกครอง การระหว่างประเทศ รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ การพัฒนา อาณาบริเวณศึกษา และประวัติศาสตร์การเมือง

2. ขอบเขตเนื้อหา

วารสารบัณฑิตพิจารณาณ์ด้านรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยเชียงใหม่ รับประทานบทความวิชาการ บทความวิจัย และบทความปริทัศน์ ทั้งภาษาไทยและภาษาอังกฤษ ซึ่งมีเนื้อหาเกี่ยวข้องกับด้านสังคมศาสตร์ การเมืองการปกครอง การระหว่างประเทศ รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ การพัฒนา อาณาบริเวณศึกษา และประวัติศาสตร์การเมือง

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6. การพิจารณาบทความ

(1) กองบรรณาธิการจะพิจารณากลับกรองบทความในเบื้องต้น โดยพิจารณาจากความสอดคล้องของเนื้อหาของบทความกับขอบเขตเนื้อหาของวารสาร ความน่าสนใจ การนำเสนอองค์ความรู้ใหม่ และความครบถ้วนตามมาตรฐานวิชาการ และจะพิจารณาความซ้ำซ้อนของบทความโดยการนำบทความเข้าสู่กระบวนการตรวจสอบการคัดลอกผลงานการเขียนทางวิชาการผ่านโปรแกรม Turnitin

(2) บทความที่ผ่านการพิจารณากลับกรองจากกองบรรณาธิการเบื้องต้น จะถูกนำเสนอให้ผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิในสาขาวิชาที่เกี่ยวข้อง อย่างน้อย 2 คน พิจารณา โดยใช้ระบบ Double-blind peer review (ผู้พิจารณาไม่ทราบชื่อผู้เขียน และผู้เขียนไม่ทราบชื่อผู้พิจารณา)

(3) กระบวนการพิจารณาบทความตามข้อ 1) และ 2) จะใช้เวลาไม่เกิน 3 เดือน โดยกองบรรณาธิการจะแจ้งผลการพิจารณาให้ผู้เขียนทราบ และหากกระบวนการพิจารณาล่าช้ากว่าที่กำหนด กองบรรณาธิการจะแจ้งให้ผู้เขียนทราบถึงความล่าช้าดังกล่าว

(4) ในกรณีที่จำเป็นต้องมีการแก้ไข หรือปรับปรุงบทความ ให้ผู้เขียนแก้ไขบทความ และนำเสนอกองบรรณาธิการภายใน 15 วันนับตั้งแต่วันที่ได้รับผลการพิจารณา

(5) การตรวจสอบความถูกต้องทางภาษา ของบทความย่อภาษาอังกฤษ (Abstract) และเนื้อหาของบทความ กรณีที่เป็นบทความภาษาอังกฤษ เป็นความรับผิดชอบของผู้เขียน ที่จะต้องดำเนินการให้ถูกต้องตามหลักไวยากรณ์ และรูปแบบการใช้ภาษาอังกฤษ ตั้งแต่ก่อนนำส่งบทความเข้าสู่ระบบ และตลอดกระบวนการพิจารณาบทความ วารสารมีสิทธิ์ปฏิเสธการตีพิมพ์บทความในกรณีที่ผู้เขียนไม่ดำเนินการแก้ไขภาษาอังกฤษให้มีความถูกต้องตามข้อเสนอแนะของกองบรรณาธิการ

(6) เมื่อกองบรรณาธิการพิจารณาบทความที่ผู้เขียนปรับแก้แล้ว ว่าเห็นสมควรให้ตอบรับการตีพิมพ์ กองบรรณาธิการจะดำเนินการออกหนังสือตอบรับการตีพิมพ์และส่งไปยังผู้เขียน

(7) กองบรรณาธิการจะนำบทความที่ผ่านการพิจารณาและแก้ไขแล้ว เข้าสู่กระบวนการจัดรูปแบบ และตีพิมพ์เผยแพร่ โดยจะแจ้งกำหนดการตีพิมพ์เผยแพร่เบื้องต้นให้ผู้เขียนทราบ

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บทบรรณาธิการ

ประเทศฟิลิปปินส์เป็นหนึ่งในสมาชิกของสมาคมประชาชาติแห่งเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ หรืออาเซียน (Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ASEAN) ประวัติศาสตร์ทางการเมืองและเศรษฐกิจของฟิลิปปินส์นั้นผ่านร้อนผ่านหนาวมาอย่างยาวนาน การเคยตกเป็นเมืองขึ้นของสเปน สหรัฐฯ และญี่ปุ่น ทำให้ฟิลิปปินส์พัฒนาสถาบันทางการเมืองและการจัดความสัมพันธ์ของสถาบันต่างๆ รวมไปถึงการพัฒนาบทบาทของผู้นำในยุคต่างๆ ออกมาแตกต่างจากประเทศอื่นๆ

และด้วยความที่ฟิลิปปินส์มีความแตกต่างในแง่ภูมิศาสตร์ อัตลักษณ์วัฒนธรรม เศรษฐกิจและการเมืองอย่างมาก การศึกษาเชิงเปรียบเทียบเพื่อเข้าใจความแตกต่างนั้นจำเป็นอย่างยิ่งที่จะทำให้ไทยเข้าใจและสามารถเรียนรู้ประสบการณ์ที่แตกต่างเหล่านั้น

วารสารฉบับนี้รวบรวมบทความที่ศึกษาเปรียบเทียบมิติต่างๆ ระหว่างไทยกับฟิลิปปินส์ โดยผู้เขียนเป็นนักศึกษาจาก The University of the Philippines ที่ Cebu อันเป็นเกาะที่สวยงามและโด่งดังด้านการท่องเที่ยวทางตอนใต้ของฟิลิปปินส์ บทความเหล่านี้ผ่านการศึกษาเปรียบเทียบประสบการณ์ที่แตกต่างเพื่อให้ผู้อ่านได้เห็นประเด็นที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการพัฒนาของทั้งสองประเทศ

ในฐานะบรรณาธิการ ขอขอบคุณ The University of the Philippines ที่ให้การสนับสนุนในด้านที่เกี่ยวข้อง จนทำให้เกิดบทความทั้งสามนี้ และทำให้วารสารนี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งในการสร้างสะพานเชื่อมความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างไทยกับฟิลิปปินส์

นรุตม์ เจริญศรี

บรรณาธิการ

Editorial

The Philippines is one of the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The political and economic history of the Philippines has been long and turbulent. Having been a colony of Spain, the United States and Japan has influenced the Philippines to develop its political institutions and the relationship among these institutions, as well as the roles of leaders throughout different eras, in a way that is distinct from other countries.

Given the significant differences in geography, cultural identity, economy, and politics, a comparative study to understand these differences is essential for Thailand to comprehend and learn from these diverse experiences.

This volume compiles articles that compare various aspects between Thailand and the Philippines. The authors are students from the University of the Philippines in Cebu, a beautiful island renowned for its tourism in the southern part of the Philippines. These articles have been studied comparatively to provide readers with insights into issues related to the development of both countries.

As the editor, I would like to thank the University of the Philippines for their support in relevant aspects, which has resulted in these three articles and made this journal a bridge for strengthening relations between Thailand and the Philippines.

Narut Charoensri

Editor-in-Chief

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Pathways to Sustainability: A Neo-Gramscian Exploration of Just Transition Initiatives in Thailand and the Philippines

April Grace Lazarito¹, Lucky Loreen Legaspi², and Paramed Loiweha³

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Abstract

With the growing role of Southeast Asia as a strategic player in the global scene and the inherently transnational nature of issues and crises, this paper examines how the involved actors within the region navigate the complex and pressing issues that threaten the advancements of the region, specifically on the issue of climate change. In the face of just transition, developing countries like Thailand and the Philippines grapple with the dilemma between fully adopting just transition policies forwarded by multilateral agreements between different states and transnational organizations and focusing on existing issues like poverty, economic instability, and quality education. The objective of this paper is threefold. First is the identification of the national and multilateral initiatives of Thailand and the Philippines on just transition. Second, the examination of the impact of these initiatives on the economic and climate discourse of these countries. Lastly, this paper will provide a comparative analysis of just transition initiatives between Thailand and the Philippines framed after Winkler's Neo-Gramscian model of just transition to analyze the current progress of the just transition process of Thailand and the Philippines and identify how the status quo influences the said process. This theory highlights the creation of a new hegemony that focuses on the roles of change agents who are working together to facilitate social change. With the limited resources available for developing countries like Thailand and the Philippines, this paper discusses their progress and initiatives in the face of these constraints. The ongoing efforts in these countries underscore a commitment to fostering inclusive and sustainable pathways in the face of economic and environmental transformations catalyzed by the climate crisis.

Keywords Just Transition, Climate Crisis, Thailand, Philippines, Southeast Asia

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1. Introduction

In the 21st century, Southeast Asia has been regarded as among the fastest-growing economies in the world, as the region was able to achieve remarkable economic growth after the 2008 financial crisis. Despite the economic uncertainties in the global economy, the growth trajectory of the region shows the promising role of Southeast Asia as a strategic player in the global scene.

However, the issue of climate change threatens the optimistic outlook of Southeast Asia, especially among developing countries. Southeast Asia, due to its expansive and densely inhabited coastlines, significant agricultural industries, and sizable portions of its population living on less than \$2, or even \$1, per day, stands especially vulnerable to the ramifications of climate change (Asian Development Bank, 2009). The study of Wijaya (2014) brings attention to the heightened vulnerability of developing countries in the face of climate change impacts and associated natural disasters. The research suggests that these nations, characterized by specific geographical location, limited adaptive capacity, and other socio-economic conditions, experience a greater susceptibility to the adverse effects of climate change than their more developed counterparts.

With the consequential effects of climate change amplifying with each passing year, the pressing need for prompt action is becoming increasingly apparent. Governments worldwide are intensifying their efforts to reduce carbon emissions, promote sustainability, and enhance resilience. However, accomplishing the objectives of the Paris Agreement, which aims to restrict the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius or less, necessitates an unprecedented shift in our existing practices. Abrupt changes can have significant repercussions on workers and society, as evidenced by past experiences, leading to the growing momentum around the concept of just transition (United Nations Development Programme, 2022).

According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (n.d.), the concept of just transition aims to ensure equitable distribution of the significant benefits that accompany the transition to a green economy while simultaneously providing support to those who may face economic losses, including countries, regions, industries, communities, workers, and consumers. With the urgent need for swift and extensive action to mitigate the risks of climate change, new economic opportunities are expected to arise. While the core focus of a just transition is environmental in nature, it is also influenced by other structural changes that impact markets, such as globalization, the existence of global unions, and the impact of climate policies on industrial occupations (Stevis, 2021).

The Philippines ranked first in the 2023 World Risk Index, while Thailand ranked 23rd (World Risk Report, 2023). The risk assessment methodology is premised on the understanding that the occurrence of a disaster is not solely determined by the magnitude of the natural hazards experienced but is also a function of the degree of society's vulnerability to their impact (World Risk Report,

2023). The Philippines is among the most susceptible to natural hazards and climate change risks, including landslides, floods, droughts, and cyclones. In the past, these storms have resulted in significant economic impacts, causing declines in real GDP, exacerbating current account balances, and putting pressure on the fiscal sector. According to the 2017 World Bank report, typhoons and earthquakes cause an average asset loss of US\$3.5 billion annually (International Monetary Fund, 2020). Meanwhile, climate change is also significantly impacting Thailand, manifesting in various ways that affect both the environment and human activities. The country experiences an increased frequency of extreme weather events, such as floods, droughts, and tropical cyclones, leading to economic losses, damage to infrastructure, and the displacement of communities (United Nations Development Programme, 2011). Thailand also confronts an alarming environmental issue in the form of PM 2.5 pollution. These fine particulate matter pollutants, measuring less than 2.5 micrometers in diameter, pose a severe health risk as they can penetrate deep into the lungs, contributing to respiratory problems and other health complications among the populace (Lekprayura, 2019). The presence of PM 2.5 in the atmosphere has become a pressing concern, exacerbating the already intricate web of challenges stemming from climate change in Thailand. Thailand and the Philippines serve as compelling case studies for climate change and the need for a just transition, as both countries face substantial vulnerability to climate-related hazards. Moreover, Thailand and the Philippines exhibit stark socio-economic disparities, with significant portions of their populations living in poverty, which amplifies the challenges in adapting to climate change impacts and transitioning to sustainable practices.

Studying Thailand and the Philippines' climate initiatives offers valuable academic insights by showcasing examples of climate change challenges and just transition efforts in diverse socio-economic settings. This study aids in refining climate policies in Southeast Asia to be more inclusive.

Recognizing the vulnerability of developing countries like the Philippines and Thailand underscores the significance of targeted efforts and international cooperation to address the unique challenges developing countries face in adapting to and mitigating the impacts of climate change. It is essential to understand and implement the just transition initiatives in the concerned countries to avoid potential disparities that may arise during the transition toward a sustainable and low-carbon economy in the face of climate change. The study aims to contribute to developing targeted policies that mitigate the adverse impacts of environmental policies on vulnerable communities while promoting inclusive economic growth by identifying and analyzing the elements of just transition. Specifically, this study aims to identify the national and multilateral initiatives of Thailand and the Philippines on just transition, examine the impact of these initiatives on the countries' economic and climate discourse, and provide a comparative analysis between Thailand and the Philippines framed after Winkler's Neo-Gramscian model of just transition.

This paper is divided into five sections. First is the introduction of the study, which contains the background, statement of the problem, and significance of the study on just transition in Southeast Asia, specifically in Thailand and the Philippines. Second, the theoretical framework made by Winkler on the Neo-Gramscian theory of just transition and how it is applied in this study will be discussed. Third is Thailand's multilateral and national initiatives on climate justice and the challenges and gaps in their initiatives. Fourth is the Philippines' multilateral and national initiatives on climate justice and the challenges and gaps in their initiatives. The fifth section is the comparative analysis of the climate justice of Thailand and the Philippines, framed after a Neo-Gramscian model of just transition, and the last section of the paper is the conclusion.


2. Theoretical Framework

Winkler (2020) highlights that the Neo-Gramscian theory revolves around the cultural hegemony practiced among the ruling class. To either challenge or reproduce cultural hegemony, a group of social forces must come together around certain key ideological elements. The difficulty of nation-states to shift towards just transition is attributed to various factors such as social inequality, poverty, and the lack of access to modern services like education or sanitation in low-income economies. These factors may take precedence over global environmental issues like climate change in these regions. The current state of affairs has been shaped by prior progress, driven mainly by fossil fuels, resulting in elevated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Unfortunately, these high-emissions growth paths have resulted in increased poverty, ongoing inequality, and other obstacles reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Winkler (2020) emphasized that the developmental trajectories adopted by industrialized nations cannot serve as the blueprint for the future.

Examining the historical prerequisites for a particular class to establish hegemony over others, Gramsci adopts the Marxist notion of ideology as a basis. By delving into what he terms a "historical bloc," he identifies three key moments. The initial phase transpires at the production level, wherein the hegemonic class undergoes an economic revolution, enabling the transformation of the economic foundation and the establishment of new productive relations. This facilitates a fresh development of the productive forces and the ability to shape their future trajectory. The second stage involves a struggle for hegemony, wherein the class vies for control over state apparatuses, endeavors to reshape the political structure of hegemony, and utilizes it to further its own interests. The third moment transpires when the dominant class disseminates a worldview throughout society where other classes accept and consent to it as the natural order without considering it a product of hegemony, fostering a new form of social integration (Woolcock, 1985).

Winkler’s Neo-Gramscian theory focuses on the creation of a new hegemony where social agents focus on working together toward the realization of a just transition. This necessitates the cooperation of all actors working together on a common goal. This is in contrast to a realist approach to international politics, where state egoism exists. Realism talks about the states’ desire to pursue and prioritize national interest because the state’s behavior is inherently “selfish, greedy, and power-seeking,” which often leads to international conflicts (Heywood, 2013). This is incompatible with the concept of just transition because the realization of just transition necessitates the cooperation of different actors, setting aside personal interests and ensuring a consensus among social agents. Moreover, just transition is also incompatible with conservatism, as conservatives are autocratic, thus rejecting any idea of reform (Heywood, 2013). A just transition entails moving away from the current state of affairs, necessitating investments in technologies and industries that are both low in emissions and labor-intensive. This involves evaluating the employment and social consequences, ensuring affordable availability of energy services, addressing traditional sectors through worker retraining, and compensating communities facing potential disruptions in their livelihoods during the transition (Winkler, 2020).

Figure 1. A theoretical framework based on Harald Winkler’s (2020) Neo-Gramscian Theory of a just transition



Source: Winkler (2020, p. 6)

Harald Winkler's Neo-Gramscian Theory of a just transition highlights the role of change agents in facilitating social change. The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the critical components of the theory, namely ideology, change agents, and fundamental conditions. As seen in Figure 1, these change agents are social forces operating across the political economy with representatives from civil society, business, and government. The theory suggests that just transition is more likely to succeed when these change agents work collaboratively to bring about the required changes. By utilizing the Neo-Gramscian framework, Winkler posits that a coalition of change agents comes together around a particular ideological element, the concept of a Just Transition. In this framework, this ideology makes these social agents unify using shared vision, values, mindsets, and narratives, which mainly revolve around the concept of just transition. This coalition is then able to garner support from other stakeholders, thereby establishing a new hegemony and ultimately transforming the underlying fundamental conditions: from regression to development, fossil-fuel energy system to green economy, from poverty to alleviation, and many more.

By analyzing the study from the lens of Neo-Gramscian Theory developed by Winkler (2020), the researchers can provide an in-depth analysis of the view of each country on the idea of just transition by taking into account the influence of prevailing cultural norms on power structures and policies related to environment and economic development. As illustrated by Figure 1, a framework created by Winkler (2020), the Neo-Gramscian Theory allows the researchers to identify and characterize the social forces and their alignment around key ideological elements that support a just transition. Moreover, the theory will also allow researchers to delve into the specific challenges of Thailand and the Philippines, such as economic disparities and historical influences that will enable them to provide a comparative analysis of why the process of just transition in countries like Thailand and the Philippines is similar or different from each other.

3. National and Multilateral Initiatives of Thailand on Climate Justice

Thailand has increased its commitment to addressing climate change with the adoption of a series of new policies, innovative strategies, and policy actions that seek to promote climate justice at both domestic and international levels in recent years. To assess the impact of these initiatives and their progress towards achieving a just transition, this section will delve into the respective national and multilateral initiatives adopted by Thailand to identify the challenges and gaps encountered in the implementation.

3.1 Multilateral Initiatives

Thailand's Third National Communication (TNC) to the UNFCCC

Thailand's Third National Communication (TNC) is a manifestation of the country's commitment to implementing climate actions to greenhouse gas emissions and improve climate resilience as guided by the framework of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is an international treaty aimed at dealing with the pressing issue of global climate change. The 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement, which is a global agreement signed with the aim of bringing countries together to fight climate change, has been established within the framework of UNFCCC (United Nations, n.d.).

Specifically, the country shows its commitment and efforts to this collective climate action on climate change by detailing national information regarding the adaptation and vulnerability of the country as well as the measures they have adopted to mitigate impacts. The communication emphasizes how climate change is on the top agenda of the country considering the reality that Thailand is among the ten countries considered to be vulnerable to the long-term impacts of climate change. It also acknowledges the constraints and limitations the country faces in implementing policies and programs such as capacity-building constraints, high investment and operation cost, and lack of adequate regional climate models among others.

Mid-century, Long-term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy

In the report Mid-century, Long-term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy submitted by Thailand in adherence to the 2015 Paris Agreement, the country enumerated its ambitious objective of reaching the highest point of its greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, aspiring to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions as soon as feasible in the second half of the century. The country further endeavors to attain carbon neutrality by 2065, seeking “enhanced international cooperation and support on finance, technology and capacity-building” to realize these goals (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2021).

This report comprehensively discusses Thailand's national circumstances, mitigation actions, and various country-specific strategies for long-term low greenhouse gas emission development. Interestingly, this report acknowledges that multisector cooperation among public and private sectors must be promoted in order for a paradigm shift to happen, leading to long-term sustainable development in Thailand.

3.2 National Initiatives

National Climate Change Master Plan 2015-2050

The National Climate Change Plan of 2015 to 2050 in Thailand provides a crucial roadmap for defining the actions, objectives, and strategies of the country towards combating climate change and strengthening resilience. The commitment of Thailand to deal with the intricate problems posed in the attainment of a just transition is reflected in this long-term plan, which covers between 2015 and 2050. With the aim to provide a long-term national framework, this initiative ensures policy continuity across successive government regimes. Utilizing the Driving Forces-Pressure-Response framework, the master plan enumerates three primary purposes, namely (1) providing a long-term national framework, (2) providing a policy framework for the development of mechanisms and tools, and (3) providing government agencies and other affiliated organizations with a framework for a detailed action plan (The Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning & Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 2015).

Specifically, three key mitigation strategies are included in the master plan, namely (1) climate change adaptation, (2) low carbon development, and (3) enabling the environment for climate change management (The Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning & Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 2015).

National Adaptation Plan (NAP) for Climate Change

The objective of the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) encompasses several key principles with the aim of aiding the country in becoming resilient and adapting to the impacts of climate change. It proposes that a structured implementation framework be provided for the government agencies and related entities of Thailand both at the national and regional levels. The framework comprises best practices, methodologies, and guidelines that are vital to the development of sector-specific strategies, management plans, and actionable initiatives focusing on different sectors and geographical regions. Additionally, the NAP for Climate Change proposes to set up a budget allocation framework for financial agencies. It aims to ensure that sufficient funding is allocated to climate change initiatives in the country, with a view to facilitating efficient implementation and resource management through the establishment of financial guidelines and allocation strategies. Finally, this initiative aims at establishing a solid foundation to strengthen community resilience and preparedness against climate change. In this connection, strategies, approaches, and practices to enable individuals to cope with the changing challenges of climate change are prioritized. The plan aims to empower the citizens of Thailand so that they can face and cope with the impacts of climate change by promoting resilient approaches and preparedness (The Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning & Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 2018).

Alternative Energy Development Plan 2018-2037

The Alternative Energy Development Plan 2018-2037 commenced in 2018, which corresponds with the 20-year National Strategy 2018-2037 of Thailand that emphasizes the promotion of energy production from the available existing alternative energy raw materials within the country. Specifically, its primary objective is to elevate the use of renewable energy and alternative energy in the form of electrical energy, heat, and biofuels to constitute 30 percent of final energy consumption by the year 2037 (Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency, 2018).

Since its enactment in 2020, the energy strategy of Thailand has primarily focused on amplifying the electricity-generating capacity, conserving energy consumption, providing sufficient natural gas, and managing various forms of fuel (Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency, 2018).

3.3 Challenges and Gaps in the Initiatives

Although Thailand's visible commitment to mitigating the impacts of climate change is evident in the national and multilateral initiatives it has adopted and implemented, these initiatives remain inadequate in ensuring lasting benefits. Despite the relentless efforts in formulating initiatives on the issue of climate change, there are still challenges and gaps that need to be addressed while striving for just transition. The concept of a just transition has dual implications. On a positive note, it leads to favorable environmental results and opens up possibilities for new business ventures and job opportunities.

Conversely, it poses challenges for industries heavily dependent on carbon-intensive technologies, serving as a major source of employment, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises and a workforce lacking the necessary skills and financial resources for a shift to environmentally friendly production. Consequently, there is a potential risk of job loss or diminished income in these sectors (Kulkolkarn, 2018).

When it comes to practical implementation of its climate policies, Thailand has encountered a number of difficulties. The country still faces setbacks when it comes to implementing the initiatives and policies into practical action on the grassroots level, even though it has established a wide range of strategies for addressing climate change. This has been illustrated by how the overall climate performance of Thailand has been historically weak (Climate Action Tracker, 2022). Addressing these gaps, which range from insufficient coordination, lack of effective mechanisms for integrating climate policies, and resource scarcity, will help the country truly achieve its goal toward just transition and sustainable development.

4. National and Multilateral Initiatives of the Philippines on Climate Justice

The Philippines has emerged as a proactive participant in national and multilateral initiatives to address the critical issues surrounding climate justice and just transition. At the domestic level, the country has instituted various policies and programs to confront the challenges posed by climate change, recognizing its unique vulnerability to environmental impacts. Concurrently, the Philippines has also actively engaged in multilateral efforts, exemplified by its commitment to international agreements to acknowledge the shared responsibility of protecting the environment.

4.1 Multilateral Initiatives

Greenhouse Gas Inventory

One of the most effective strategies to combat climate change is to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. This approach has been recognized as crucial by the international community, with over 192 countries adopting the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The ultimate goal of this convention is to maintain atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at levels that would avert harmful human-induced disruptions to the climate system. The Philippine Government has demonstrated its commitment to this objective by crafting the 2010 National Greenhouse Gas Inventory through the hard work and dedication of the Philippine Greenhouse Gas Inventory Management and Reporting System (PGHGIMRS). Completed in 2019, this inventory was instrumental in projecting the Business-As-Usual emissions scenario used for the Philippines' First Nationally Determined Contributions (National Integrated Climate Change Database Information and Exchange System, n.d.-a.).

Paris Agreement

The Philippines has made a significant move towards significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions by signing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. This four-clause pact represents the country's commitment to adopting clean energy solutions, developing technologies and policies to facilitate a transition to renewable energy, and halting the construction of new coal-fired power plants. Additionally, the agreement outlines a commitment to strengthening domestic and international efforts towards a just transition from coal power, a crucial step in the global fight against climate change (Reuters, 2017).

End Coal Use by 2030

During the COP26, 40 countries, including the Philippines, committed to cease using coal by 2030, representing a significant and forward-thinking step toward addressing the pressing global issue of climate change. This decision, often regarded as a monumental pledge, underscores the country's recognition of the environmental and social impacts associated with coal-fired power generation. The

Philippines aligns with the global movement towards sustainable and low-carbon energy sources by setting a specific target for phasing out coal. The move signals a commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve air quality, and promote public health. This decision also reflects a proactive approach to the changing landscape of international energy markets and a commitment to fostering a just transition (Subingsubing, 2021).

4.2 National Initiatives

Nationally Determined Contribution

Upon ratification of the Paris Agreement, the Philippine Government established a self-imposed deadline to present its initial Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) on or before 2020 (Climate Change Commission, n.d.). Following this, the Philippines has committed to reducing its projected greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 75% for the period 2020 to 2030. This reduction and avoidance will be achieved across various sectors, including agriculture, waste, industry, transport, and energy. Out of this commitment, 2.71% is unconditional. In addition to reducing emissions, the country is also taking measures to adapt to the impacts of climate change. These measures will be implemented across several sectors, including agriculture, forestry, coastal and marine ecosystems, biodiversity, health, and human security. The goal is to pre-empt, reduce, and address any residual loss and damage caused by climate change (United Nations Development Programme, 2022).

National Climate Change Action Plan 2011-2028

The Climate Change Act establishes a Climate Change Commission and provides budgetary resources for its significant responsibilities. These include formulating a comprehensive strategy and program in consultation with global efforts to manage climate change, integrating climate risk reduction into national, sectoral, and local development plans and programs, providing policy recommendations and key development investments in climate-sensitive sectors, assessing vulnerability, and facilitating capacity building. The National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) is a translation of the national climate change framework strategy. It sets out a strategic direction for the period 2011 to 2028, prioritizing key areas such as food security, water sufficiency, ecological and environmental stability, human security, climate-smart industries and services, sustainable energy, and knowledge and capacity development. These priorities align with the national agenda and underscore the critical role of addressing climate change in ensuring sustainable development (Climate Change Commission, 2012).

Local Climate Change Action Plan

As per the mandate outlined in the Local Government Code of 1991, it is the responsibility of local governments to exercise their devolved powers and collaborate with the national government to promote and maintain ecological

balance within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Moreover, based on the DILG Memorandum Circular 2014-135, it is recommended that local governments at the city and municipal level incorporate climate change adaptation as part of their regular functions. Additionally, these efforts should be supported by provincial governments through technical assistance, enforcement, and information management (Department of the Interior and Local Government, 2014).

The Local Climate Change Action Plan is a comprehensive strategy developed by local governments to address the critical issue of climate change. It encompasses both climate change adaptation and mitigation measures, outlining how LGUs intend to respond to the impacts of climate change and integrate them into local development plans. These development plans, including the land use plan, sectoral development plan, and investment program, aim to mainstream climate change considerations into local governance and promote sustainable development goals (National Integrated Climate Change Database Information and Exchange System, n.d.-b.).

4.3 Challenges and Gaps in the Initiatives

The Philippines has taken the commendable step of being the first country in the Southeast Asian region to declare a moratorium on new coal and is implementing various measures to boost renewable energy. However, despite these actions, the growth of emissions cannot be completely halted. The moratorium implemented in 2020 still allowed coal power plants that were in the pipeline at that time to proceed, resulting in the addition of 2.6 GW of coal capacity by 2025. As per the existing policies, coal will continue to be the primary source of electricity generation in the Philippines until 2030 (Climate Action Tracker, 2023).

Although the government has already laid out its plan for a just transition, there is low awareness of Just Transition and transition policies among the grassroots. Moreover, even though different sectors acknowledge the need to modernize to give way for a Just Transition. Some stakeholders, like transport groups, state that the Public Utility Vehicle (PUV) modernization is an unjust transition and highlights the need for transition funds to support the affected sectors to really embody sustainable development for the country (Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development, 2018).

5. Comparative Analysis of the Climate Justice of Thailand and the Philippines Framed after a Neo-Gramscian Model of Just Transition

Developing nations such as Thailand and the Philippines face a complex intersection of environmental degradation, social inequality, and economic development, making the pursuit of a just transition of utmost significance. This section conducts a comparative analysis of Thailand and the Philippines' just transition initiatives, using Winkler's Neo-Gramscian model of just transition as a theoretical framework. The Neo-Gramscian perspective offers a critical viewpoint,

highlighting the interdependence of power relations, cultural hegemony, and social forces regarding just transition policies. By utilizing this theoretical framework, this study aims to uncover how these nations handle the intricacies of just transition.

5.1 Just Transition as an Ideological Element

The Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development (2018) has reported that while the Philippines may not be leading the global race to transition towards cleaner and renewable energy, it is one of the Asian countries that has taken firm and decisive action toward this goal. In 2008, the country implemented the Renewable Energy Law and has since adopted other policies that reflect aspects of a just transition. However, the Philippines' energy sector is facing a critical dilemma as it stands at a crucial juncture. Despite the country's rapidly growing economy, the majority of its energy consumption is derived from coal. Simultaneously, the Philippines has been spearheading the movement to restrict global temperatures to a maximum of 1.5 degrees Celsius. The country has also submitted ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), with a conditional greenhouse gas reduction target of 70 percent below business-as-usual (BAU) levels by 2030 (Verzola, Logarta, & Maniego, 2017). Just Transition as an ideological element has gained significant traction in the Philippines, with various stakeholders committing to driving investment in climate and sustainability initiatives. The goal is to achieve a climate-smart and climate-resilient Philippines by 2050, with a particular focus on accelerating the transition from coal to renewable energy. A Statement of Commitment has been signed by government leaders, business and financial sectors, and civil society organizations, pledging to support the availability and accessibility of financing mechanisms for climate and sustainability projects. This commitment is expected to hasten low-carbon development in the country and facilitate a smooth transition to renewable energy sources (Climate Change Commission, 2022).

On the other hand, Thailand is undergoing a significant economic transition that prioritizes ecological sustainability and adherence to the principles of a “sufficiency economy” philosophy. The country's highest policy level, the 20-year National Strategy (2018-2037), is focused on developing a green economy agenda, which is also reflected in its national policy and planning documents. These plans align with Thailand’s commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement, as stipulated in Thailand’s Nationally Defined Contributions (International Labour Organization, 2023). Despite Thailand's current practices and policies, the concept of Just Transition as an ideological element has not yet permeated the country's public domain. There is a pressing need to increase awareness among the general public, particularly those whose livelihoods are likely to be most affected by the planned shift away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy. Unfortunately, there is a lack of discussion regarding the significance of clean energy, and even less attention is given to the

social dimension of this transition. When there is clamor, it is often focused on the potential job losses in the energy and manufacturing sectors, which are perceived as a significant threat (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Asia, 2022a).

5.2 Change Agents

In the Philippines, various workers' groups and trade unions, such as Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino, SOSYALISTA, and Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, have demonstrated a deep understanding of the gravity of the issues of climate change and labor rights in the country. The majority of these groups have identified the current exploitative economic system as the primary driver of these issues. This is because the pursuit of concentrated growth disregards the limits of both environmental and human resources, which exacerbates these issues. In light of the issue of climate change, it has been acknowledged by the leaders of transport groups that the transport sector has a significant role to play in the transition. However, they have demanded a genuine just transition and the need for a government subsidy or "transition funds" in response to the introduction of new PUJ models, which are estimated to cost around 1.6 million pesos, an amount that most operators cannot afford (Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development, 2018). Meanwhile, the adaptation of the energy sector to climate change centers around the key themes of power generation, energy efficiency, and conservation. The Department of Energy leads the Energy Technical Working Group, which gives priority to advancing renewable energy while diverting attention from fossil fuels. The sector underscores the significance of conserving energy and enhancing efficiency, in addition to exploring alternative power sources like natural gas and electricity for transportation and manufacturing. This policy focus holds promise for development, given the country's abundant renewable energy resources (Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 2009).

On the other hand, FES Philippines, a non-government organization, has proactively addressed the complex dilemmas that arise amidst the intersection of sustainability and justice. In this regard, the organization has collaborated with its youth partners to establish a Youth for Just Transition (Y4JT) Network. The primary objective of this network is to chart a viable course towards sustainability, which benefits all stakeholders while ensuring that no one is left behind. These youth partners have been advocating for significant reductions in CO₂ emissions by 2030, with a goal of achieving net zero by 2050. Their efforts also aim to improve nationwide energy access, security, and sustainability while addressing existing systemic gaps and inequalities. Additionally, they are working to engage a broader network of young people in weather- and climate-vulnerable communities (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Asia, 2022b).

In the case of Thailand, there are also multiple stakeholders involved in addressing the issue of climate change and its impact on the country, including government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), independent

research institutions, international organizations, and even the business sectors. Among government agencies, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment is a government agency of the country with a mission to forward a multifaceted approach towards the conservation, restoration, and regulation of natural resources and the environment, aiming to foster sustainable socio-economic development (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, n.d). This involves advancing strategies geared towards creating social and economic value while ensuring the preservation of environmental resources. Additionally, a pivotal objective involves fostering collaboration and engagement among various stakeholders, both domestically and internationally, within ASEAN and beyond. This inclusive approach seeks to integrate the efforts and inputs from diverse parties and sectors in managing natural resources and environmental initiatives. Moreover, the organization focuses on bolstering its proactive capabilities by strengthening systems, mechanisms, and data utilization. This enhancement aims at optimizing administrative processes and improving the efficacy of law enforcement, facilitating more effective implementation and management of environmental policies and regulations. Other government agencies that are also affiliated with the issue of climate change in the country include the Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency and the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning.

Among non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Thailand Environment Institute (TEI) is dedicated to addressing environmental concerns guided by the principle that collaborative alliances are instrumental in attaining sustainable development and enhancing overall living standards. TEI promotes an inclusive strategy that encourages collective environmental accountability by formulating environmental guidelines and bridging the gap between policies and practical steps, fostering substantial environmental advancements in Thailand. Moreover, the institute advocates for a participatory model that emphasizes shared responsibility among stakeholders in tackling environmental challenges.

5.3 Transforming Fundamental Conditions

According to Verzola, Logarta, and Maniego (2017), the subject of energy transition is a complex matter in the Philippines, given the country's archipelagic nature, high energy rates, susceptibility of energy infrastructures to extreme weather conditions, privatized electricity markets, limited government subsidies, and increasing demand due to rapid economic and population growth. The conflicting forces influencing the transition process include fossil fuel interests, climate change mitigation and adaptation advocates, and stakeholders affected by the transition. Resolving the inherent conflicts between the privatized electricity sector and governmental regulatory entities assumes paramount significance in realizing the objectives of ensuring a steadfast, economically viable, and dependable power supply. Furthermore, the government plays a pivotal role in facilitating a seamless

shift toward a low-carbon trajectory characterized by fairness for all. Achieving a just transition entails advocating for widespread accessibility, impartial allocation of costs and benefits, fostering consumer choice, promoting market competition, and ensuring equitable treatment of investors, irrespective of their scale. Additionally, it is essential to implement policies and regulations in a transparent and consistent manner to achieve a socially just transition. Providing that specific conditions and objectives are met, attaining this goal is politically feasible.

Similarly, Thailand faces the same challenges and dilemmas in terms of fundamental conditions. Since the adoption of the Energy Conservation Promotion Act in 1992 and the creation of the Ministry of Environment in 2002, Thailand has been gradually moving towards an energy transition. The country has made significant progress toward the renewable energy and energy efficiency goals set out in the Power Development Plan (PDP), Energy Efficiency Development Plan (EEP), and Alternative Energy Development Plan (AEDP). However, despite incorporating energy conservation policies, actions, and programs into a wide range of energy plans aligned with national development objectives, the country's accomplishments still fell short. (Sirasoontorn & Koomsup, 2017). Among the fundamental conditions that need to be addressed in order to make a just transition feasible include capacity limitations, fragmented authority, policy discontinuity, and lack of coordination between the public and private sectors. The challenges could be reflected in the Strategic Management Plan for Stakeholder Engagement 2024-2028, which included the 11 engaged sectors, aimed at bridging the gap between sectors by determining the stakeholders of Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), managing and responding to the issues, expectations, and complaints of EGAT stakeholders at the organizational level, and assessing the adequacy of response measures for stakeholders, to establish additional measures to build trust and develop a strong relationship between EGAT and key stakeholders (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, 2021).

6. Conclusion

This paper provides a discussion of the national and multilateral initiatives adopted by Thailand and the Philippines and a comparative analysis of their efforts on the attainment of climate justice and just transition. The analysis of this paper revealed that the national initiatives implemented by both countries are heavily anchored from the multilateral initiatives they participated in in the international landscape. This shows how both countries express commitment to mitigating climate change impacts and their willingness to work collaboratively by acknowledging that climate crisis and Just Transition is a shared responsibility of every nation-state.

In understanding the efforts of Thailand and the Philippines in Just Transition discourse, Winkler's (2020) Neo-Gramscian model on Just Transition

provides that a social group must come together around certain key ideological elements in order to challenge the cultural hegemony that hinders the attainment of just transition. As he said, changed agents play a significant role in facilitating social change. For a just transition to succeed, these changed agents must work collaboratively to produce the required changes. Hence, this paper explored how, although both countries have multiple changed agents that support just transition, transforming the underlying fundamental conditions that are required in establishing a new hegemony has not materialized, given how the implementation process of the initiatives adopted is faced with challenges. This analysis emphasizes that as long as governments do not take into consideration the voices and the lived experiences of the people on the grassroots level, the sophisticated frameworks and plans developed nationally and internationally throughout the decades will only remain promising on paper. Moreover, the analysis also highlighted that multilateralism can be a core part of establishing a broad, global alliance for a just transition (Winkler, 2020) by strengthening the catalytic role of conventions such as the UNFCCC and other non-state actors.

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Traversing Poverty Alleviation Initiatives: A Comparative Analysis of the Welfare Card System in Thailand and Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the Philippines

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Abstract

Intensified by flawed program designs and implementation, the Welfare Card System (WCS) in Thailand and the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the Philippines have long lapsed in alleviating poverty in both countries. We attempt to elucidate these initiatives' operationalization by comparatively analyzing the two. Nevertheless, we contend that despite flawed and vulnerable operations, they aid impoverished households. This paper aims to (a) examine the WCS as part of the poverty-reduction initiatives in Thailand and the 4PS in the Philippines, (b) assess its challenges in the implementation, and (c) comparatively analyze these initiatives' efficiency. This paper uses new public administration theory to further understand the delivery and operationalization of the poverty alleviation initiatives in both Thailand and the Philippines by closely looking into the implementation of the programs. This paper utilizes a qualitative comparative case study design with secondary information from online databases to answer the research questions. The findings show that these initiatives have short-term positive effects on poor households as they provide subsidies for basic needs, financial and educational support, and transportation services; however, these so-called poverty alleviation initiatives did not genuinely aid Thailand and the Philippines in diminishing the entirety of poverty.

Keywords Poverty, Poverty-alleviation Initiatives, Welfare Card System, 4Ps

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1. Introduction

What about individuals who are disadvantaged and have limited access to resources? Poverty is the most devastating of all injustices and the worst of atrocities in all countries. Modern society is confronted with the enduring and urgent worldwide issue of poverty. It goes much beyond merely acknowledging the fact that poverty is a terrible tragedy that destroys the lives of countless numbers of people globally. Although the traditional understanding of poverty as merely a lack of money may be deeply ingrained in our thoughts, in the end, we need to regard poverty as a variety of forms of deprivation, including a lack of jobs, schools, healthcare facilities, and educational opportunities, as well as a lack of access to medicine and other basic necessities of life.

The notion that a country is experiencing economic growth while the impoverished population remains in a state of poverty, if not worsening, is puzzling to numerous individuals. This has been a genuine social problem because poverty, particularly in terms of unequal access to resources, prevents millions of Thai and Filipinos from living a dignified and healthy life. The truth is that the impoverished endure numerous struggles, including but not limited to starvation, malnutrition, neglected diseases, and early mortality. More so, they suffer from a lack of education and competencies needed to earn decent incomes further making lives more difficult.

According to the United Nations (n.d), the SDGs' main reference to combating poverty is made in the target of ensuring resource mobilization through improved cooperation to adequately provide means to developing countries in implementing poverty alleviation programs and policies.

According to statistics, high growth rates and structural change have helped the nation reduce poverty from 58% in 1990 to 6.8% in 2020, yet 79% of the poor still live in the countryside and predominantly in households involved in agriculture; following a slowdown in the economy, stagnant agricultural and company incomes, and the COVID-19 issue, Thailand's poverty reduction slowed from 2015 on, with poverty rising in 2016, 2018, and 2020 (World Bank, 2023). In just one year, Thailand's disadvantaged population grew by more than 1.3 million (World Bank, 2023). While, according to Macasero (2023), there was a decrease in the proportion of Filipino individuals identifying as impoverished, with the percentage declining from 51% in March 2023 to 45% by the end of June.

With this, the State Welfare Card Scheme, commonly known as “the card for the poor”, a poverty alleviation strategy in Thailand since October 2017 aims to provide a monthly allowance, between 200-300 Thai Baht (5.63-8.45 USD), to the beneficiaries, specifically, the low-income earners (Durongkaverroj, 2022; Kanmalay et al., 2022). The Nation (2023) reported 14.5 million Thai beneficiaries in the new batch of the State Welfare Card; making the project a crucial tool the government has been utilizing to strengthen the country's support

for the underprivileged (Bangkok Post, 2023). Similarly, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) is a government-led project in 2007 (Official Gazette, n.d.), under the management of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) aimed at addressing poverty in the Philippines. This program provides conditional cash transfers to the country's residents, contingent upon their compliance with pre-established criteria and rules.

However, these policies of both countries have different advantages and disadvantages. Starting with the advantages of the welfare card system in Thailand; this card allows low-income groups to buy things they need in their daily lives and have money to live on, which may help them overcome poverty, but these mechanisms still lack clarity in a context where citizens cannot reflect on their demands for policy. Moreover, it is possible that the state welfare card is being used as a tool for creating patronage relationships rather than as a policy for solving the problem of sustainable inequality (Phattarasukkomjorn, 2021). Similarly, in the case of the Philippines, 4Ps provides cash grants to the poorest families, enabling them to meet basic needs like food, shelter, healthcare, and even cash transfers that lessen the burden of student-beneficiaries in their education. 4Ps has woven itself into the fabric of Filipino society, offering a lifeline to millions trapped in the clutches of economic hardship. Examining both its enduring importance and undeniable advantages reveals a program not just alleviating poverty, but fostering human capital and laying the groundwork for a brighter future. On the other hand, with limited resources and complex data, identifying the most vulnerable families remains a challenge. This creates a sense of injustice and undermines the program's credibility. Corruption and administrative inefficiencies further damage the program's image (Tulfo, 2022). Instances of bribery, ghost beneficiaries, and delayed payouts erode public trust and divert resources away from those in need.

While heralded for its results, it isn't without a shadow cast by its gaps. While it empowers, it can also create dependence. While it nurtures, it can also breed stigmas. Examining these downsides reveals a program in need of continuous improvement, lest it inadvertently perpetuates the issues it strives to overcome. Despite its initial success in terms of providing Thai and Filipino beneficiaries with subsidies for basic necessities, and financial and educational support, these initiatives have flaws in their program designs and operationalization leading to these initiatives' long lapse in alleviating poverty.

Hence, this study aims to (a) examine the WCS as part of the poverty-reduction initiatives in Thailand and the 4Ps in the Philippines, (b) analyze the challenges in the implementation of these poverty-reduction initiatives in Thailand and the Philippines, and (c) comparatively analyze the efficiency of the welfare card system in Thailand and the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in the Philippines as the poverty-reduction initiatives in both countries.

In the succeeding parts, we will explain the theoretical framework; the state welfare card in Thailand, and the 4Ps in the Philippines including their positive impacts, negative impacts, and the gaps in the operationalizations. The comparative analysis, conclusion, and recommendations.

This paper is divided into six major parts: introduction, theoretical framework, state welfare card in Thailand, and the 4Ps in the Philippines (including their positive effects, negative effects, and gaps in implementation), comparative analysis, and conclusion and recommendations.

2. Theoretical Perspective

New Public Administration Theory

The emergence of new public administration occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s, a time marked by political discord and turmoil. This development was prompted by various factors, including the Vietnam War, widespread confusion in the Western world, especially in the United States, ongoing racial tensions, and disenchantment with the goals and principles of public administration; massive unemployment prevailed, and conventional public administration nearly gave up trying to deal with the issues as emphasized by Frederickson (1980). The traditional public administration, which was founded on the principles of efficiency and economy, was unable to adequately address the growing unrest and the resulting issues from the instability in politics. Following this, several of the most competent young public administration scholars started to realize the truth and started to doubt their field and career. Eventually, within the field, a methodology was established to find a new public administration, one that was capable of addressing societal issues that had remained unsolved throughout the 1960s and sensitive to those issues (Frederickson, 1980). The subsequent principles are the fundamental doctrines of the novel new public administration theory.

Social Equity, the traditional goals and justification for public administration are practically invariably enhanced management— more economical and efficient; the new public administration, however, incorporates social equity. The goal of traditional public administration is to maximize economy and efficiency, but the new public administration also asks, "Does this service increase social equity? The term "social equity" encompasses a wide range of value preferences as well as preferences for management styles and organizational designs. Emphasis is placed on equal access to government services, public managers' accountability for decisions and system operationalization, modifications to public management, receptivity to citizen needs rather than those of public organizations, and an interdisciplinary, applied, problem-solving-oriented, and theoretically viable approach to public administration education (Frederickson, 1980).

Value-Free, following this principle, managers are not impartial. As ideals, objectives, or justifications, they ought to be dedicated to social justice and sound management (Frederickson, 1980). Most importantly, the new public administration forwards the mechanism of holding government officials accountable for their actions and decisions.

Innovation and Change, the emphasis of the new public administration is on innovation and transformation, as emphasized by Frederickson (1996) further delineating that its main characteristic is a keen awareness of and concern for contemporary socio-economic issues. In this context, novel organizational structures are developed to adapt to the rapidly evolving surroundings. According to the new public administration, social integration requires modification; fighting against powerful forces and stagnation is vital. It lays a strong emphasis on streamlining administrative tasks and lessening bureaucratic tendencies in governmental organizations and ensures the use of innovative solutions to address emerging problems that can respond to dynamics and evolving situations (Frederickson et al., 2016; Lamidi, 2015).

Public Interest and Citizen Participation, the new public administration theory promotes a client-centric approach as highlighted by Lamidi (2015). It seeks to empower administrators to grant the people significant influence over the timing, manner, and content of the provisions. It is advisable to implement de-bureaucratization, participatory decision-making, and decentralization of administrative procedures to enhance the efficiency and human-centered delivery of public services. For a long time, open and fully democratic decision procedures have been considered essential principles of effective management. Therefore, new public administration commonly emphasizes citizen engagement, local management, decentralized management, and democratic work management. The target population's needs and preferences are taken into consideration by the programs. Other than that, Frederickson (1996) emphasized that it encourages feedback mechanisms that emphasize the responsiveness of the citizens and allow them to express concerns regarding the programs imposed by the public administrators.

The advent of the new public administration theory transformed the conventional approach to public administration by introducing a comprehensive viewpoint that integrates legislation, governance, and policy implementation as a unified and interconnected process involving all pertinent stakeholders. The aforementioned shift has effectively converted public administration into an academic discipline that exhibits a profound understanding of societal matters. New public administration seeks to redefine the field of public administration, highlighting the importance of a socially responsible and responsive government that prioritizes public interest and social equity over mere efficiency and procedural correctness.

Using the lens of new public administration theory in comparatively analyzing the Welfare Card System in Thailand and the 4Ps in the Philippines provides a comprehensive framework for evaluating these social welfare programs based on their adherence to principles of social equity, value-free, innovation and change, and public interest and citizen participation. By analyzing the study through the lens of new public administration theory, the researchers can provide a more informed comparative analysis between Thailand and the Philippines' poverty-alleviation programs, specifically on how they are different or similar from one another. Moreover, it enables a nuanced understanding of the positive effects, negative effects, and gaps in the implementation of these programs, ultimately contributing to comprehensive public administration practices.

3. State Welfare Card Scheme in Thailand

As part of this measure, the State Welfare Card Scheme, commonly known as “the card for the poor”, a poverty alleviation strategy in Thailand was first made available for registration by the Thai government in 2016 and went into effect in 2017 (Phattarasukumjorn, 2021). The card was available to those who did not possess valuable resources and earned less than 100,000 Thai Baht (2,815.67 USD) annually; with it, users may receive discounts on daily purchases. It aims to provide a monthly allowance, of between 200-300 Thai Baht (5.63-8.45 USD), to the beneficiaries, specifically, the low-income earners (Kanmalay, et al., 2022), the exact figure varies depending on the annual income of the beneficiaries themselves (Durongkaverroj, 2022). A decision approving 42 billion Thai Baht (1,182,765,402.00 USD) to cover the cost of the welfare card for around 12 million lower-class Thais was issued by the Cabinet on August 29, 2017. Additionally, every three months, members are eligible for a 45 Thai Baht (1.27 USD) discount on cooking gas transactions and they are entitled to 500 Thai Baht (14.08 USD) per month for trains, 500 Thai Baht (14.08 USD) for intercity buses, and 500 Thai Baht (14.08 USD) for city bus and electric train tickets (Jandaeng et al., 2019); furthermore, Chuensukjit (2023) reported that a 750 Thai Baht (21.12 USD) monthly travel subsidy for welfare card recipients will soon be available for use toward boat trips.

According to The Nation (2023), there are 14.5 million Thai beneficiaries in the new round of the State Welfare Card; making the project a crucial tool the government has been utilizing to strengthen the country's support for the underprivileged (Bangkok Post, 2023).

3.1 Positive Effects of WCS

Eleven out of fourteen million applicants were verified to meet the five requirements set forth by the government: they had to be citizens of Thailand, be at least eighteen years old, unemployed or earning less than 100,000 Thai Baht

(2,816.19 USD) annually, do not own real estate, and have no financial assets worth more than 100,000 Thai Baht (2,816.19 USD) (Kanmalay et al., 2022).

Under this initiative, cardholders may utilize their cards to make purchases at an authorized store called the "Thong Fah Shop," which offers subsidized prices on common consumer goods including rice, shampoo, and detergent. This guarantees that the recipients have supplies for their daily needs and something to put on their table for meals. The cards can also be used on Thailand's public transportation networks, which include buses, trains, and public transportation in cities, enabling the beneficiaries to travel without incurring large costs for transportation (Chuensukjit, 2023). To further ease the financial strain on financially challenged Thai residents, Phattarasukumjorn (2021) highlighted information that is compiled from Cabinet resolutions and documents that the government also credits between 200-300 Thai Baht (5.63-8.45 USD) every month to the cards; the precise amount varies based on the cardholder's annual income. Additionally, Jandaeng et al. (2019) pointed out that the state welfare card effort has initially addressed issues of inequality by improving people's quality of life.

3.2 Negative Effects of WCS

Not Promoting Purchases from Local Vendors

The majority of the funds will go to the 20,000 authorized businesses as well as particular manufacturers and distributors of the goods they stock, even though the program has the potential to inject almost 17 billion Thai Baht (478,886,770.00 USD) into local economies (Bangkok Post, 2017), street, and fresh market sellers, as well as other local businesses have less probability of gaining profits from the purchases of the cardholders since only a small number of retailers have installed welfare card-reading electronic data capture (EDC) equipment.

Restriction in the Purchase

In addition to the previously mentioned, the primary issue is a restriction on the locations where the 11.7 million registered poor people are allowed to shop. They are limited to purchasing only those goods that have been chosen for sale in those stores; once they enter the stores, they are only allowed to purchase the brands and categories of consumer goods that the state has chosen to stock (Kanmalay, et. al, 2022). Hence, if certain goods are not available in the authorized stores, they cannot buy them. Aside from that, customers can only use the money in specific retailers that have benefit card-reading electronic data capture (EDC) equipment installed. About 20,000 government-designated stores exist, and about 25% of them currently have the EDC installed adding to the problem of purchase restrictions due to the placement of the Thong Fah Shop (Bangkok Post, 2017).

Instrument for Patronage

In addition to the negative implications outlined in the preceding paragraphs, Kanmalay et al. (2022) stated that, from a different perspective, it might be contended that the Welfare Card System is employed as a means of bolstering the standing and popularity of certain political parties. Similarly, the summary of the study results by Phattarasukumjorn (2021) indicated that there was potential for WCS to have been utilized as an avenue to build patronage ties.

3.3 Gaps in the Implementation of WCS

To make the most economical use of the welfare budget, the government sought to more precisely direct financial support to those who truly needed it. However, whether the people who applied for the card had lower incomes was unclear.

Flawed Eligibility Screening System

Approximately 11 million people possess welfare cards, which is a far higher number than the 5.8 million persons classified as poor by Thailand's National Economic and Social Development Board, and a sizeable portion of the country's 67 million inhabitants. To put it succinctly, Yang et al. (2020) found that more people qualified for the program than were considered impoverished according to the official national poverty line. This raises concerns about the reliability of the eligibility screening procedure.

It has been rendered quite clear in the eligibility requirements that jobless people may apply. Nonetheless, according to the CEIC Data (2023) report, Thailand's unemployment rate is extremely low, coming in at just 0.85% of the labor force in September 2023 as opposed to the previously stated 0.98% in August 2023. As a result, the number of cards greatly exceeds the number of people who require the program. Due to certain claims that the program was not adequately targeted and includes people who are not poor, it is unclear whether the policy's requirements reached economically deprived individuals (Yang et al., 2020).

Moreover, the findings of the study by Jandaeng et al. (2019) revealed the parameters used to select beneficiaries of welfare cards in 2017 were mostly based on property and income, and they did not make use of any other economic or social data that the government obtained through registration. As a result, these criteria have the potential to generate leaks. As an example cited by Jandaeng et al. (2019), students coming from well-to-do families can be beneficiaries if they have never opened bank accounts or are listed as the owners of assets. Due to a screening gap, wealthy individuals were able to obtain welfare cards.

4. Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program in the Philippines (4Ps)

The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program, also referred to as 4Ps and previously known as Bangon Pamilyang Pilipino, is a conditional cash transfer initiative implemented by the Philippine government through the Department of Social Welfare and Development. The primary objective is to eliminate severe poverty in the Philippines through targeted investments in healthcare and education.

According to Diaz (2021), the Philippines launched the 4Ps, the nation's conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, with the goal of giving conditional cash grants to the poorest of the poor, due to the high prevalence of impoverished families and individuals in the country as a whole. Eligibility is limited to the most impoverished families, as determined by the 2003 Small Area Estimate (SAE) survey conducted by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB).

The 4Ps program offers two categories of financial grants that are distributed to eligible households. The health grant provides a monthly amount of P500 (10.72 USD) for each household, resulting in a total of P6,000 (107.25 USD) annually. The education grant provides a monthly allowance of P300 (5.36 USD) per kid for a duration of ten months, resulting in a total of P3,000 (53.67 USD) annually. A household can enroll up to three children in the program. A household with three children is eligible to receive a monthly cash award of P1,400 (25.02 USD), amounting to a total of P15,000 (268.35 USD) per year for a duration of five years, through the two available cash grant programs (Official Gazette, n.d.).

The most impoverished individuals are identified using a proxy-means test. Proxy variables, such as asset ownership, home type, education level of the household head, family livelihood, and access to water and sanitary services, serve as economic indicators to determine the economic category of a family. Households are eligible if they have children and/or if they have pregnant women at the time of the evaluation. Applicants are required to comply with all the conditions established by the government to participate in the program.

Hence, the 4Ps has stood as a beacon of hope in the Philippines' fight against poverty. This conditional cash transfer program, aimed at the country's poorest families, has received both praise and scrutiny. While acknowledging the challenges and potential pitfalls, examining the undeniable advantages of the 4Ps reveals its profound impact on human capital development, economic empowerment, and community well-being.

4.1 Positive Effects of 4Ps

The Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program, also known as 4Ps, is a governmental initiative that offers conditional cash assistance to the most impoverished individuals in the Philippines. The 4Ps aids in ending the cycle of poverty. Additionally, the program improves households' capacity to meet the needs of their families and children. In general, the 4Ps concept seeks to enhance

the quality of life by giving the poor the tools, resources, and support they need to prosper. The program aims to disrupt the cycle of poverty by ensuring the physical well-being and educational continuity of children aged 0-18, enhancing their prospects for a more favorable future (World Bank, 2017). Moreover, it has the objective of social assistance and social development. Social assistance refers to a program that offers financial aid and monetary assistance to impoverished households, enabling them to alleviate poverty and fulfill their fundamental and urgent requirements, such as housing, nourishment, and clothes (Talimio & Salagubang, 2019).

The program possesses an exceedingly extensive poverty-targeting database, which currently encompasses 75% of the nation's populace. It has been widely utilized to determine those who are economically disadvantaged to qualify them for national and local government initiatives (World Bank, 2017). The 4Ps initiative aims to empower beneficiaries by informing them of their entitlements, offering social assistance, facilitating access to economic resources, promoting professional growth, and equipping them with skills necessary for self-employment and revenue generation. The talents they gain can be shared with others, creating a domino effect that empowers everyone in society.

Moreover, according to Sy et al. (2019), the majority of students concur that the 4Ps help them stay motivated to attend class, drive themselves academically to excel in their classes, encourage them to complete all of their coursework, and give them financial support to meet their basic needs. Thus, by promoting school attendance, this investment in education paves the way for higher future earning potential, improved social mobility, and a more skilled workforce.

Furthermore, the program's focus on proactive healthcare has resulted in a rise in the utilization of health services, enhanced rates of child immunization, and a decrease in childhood mortality. Regular access to check-ups and preventative actions not only enhances individual well-being but also alleviates the long-term strain on the healthcare system.

At the heart of 4Ps' enduring impact lies its unwavering commitment to human capital development. The program's conditional grants incentivize education and healthcare, fostering a generation equipped with the knowledge and skills necessary to break free from the shackles of poverty. The program's focus on education and healthcare strengthens community bonds by promoting shared values and collective well-being. It can also contribute to reduced crime rates and a more stable social environment.

4.2 Negative Effects of 4Ps

Unequal Distribution of Resources and Opportunities

The 4Ps is receiving criticism for its apparent incapacity to alleviate widespread poverty. This is extremely peculiar given that the program was never

intended to accomplish this goal. Reyes (2022) states that former Social Welfare Secretary Judy Taguiwalo stated that the 4Ps should not be seen as a "stand-alone" program that will instantly alleviate poverty. According to Lalu (2022), there may have been oversights in the program's execution, as evidenced by complaints from beneficiaries. These complaints include but are not limited to, issues with receiving monthly financial benefits on time and reductions in the amounts received in various areas across the country covered by the poverty initiative program.

Navigating the complex bureaucratic machinery of 4Ps can be a daunting task, particularly for the poorest and most marginalized families. Delayed payouts, convoluted registration processes, and lack of accessible information can discourage even the most determined recipients.

Dependency on the Cash Grant

Tulfo (2022) states that the 4Ps aims to assist families in coping with severe poverty. However, it has been exploited by numerous families and individuals. Buenaagua (2022) reported that the Commission on Audit (COA) has lately advised conducting a thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of this government initiative. According to its findings, almost 3.82 million or 90% of the 4.26 million households receiving benefits from the program are still living below the poverty level, even though they have been enrolled in the program for a maximum of 13 years. Parent beneficiaries are no longer employed and are solely reliant and dependent on government financial aid. Given that the 4Ps were implemented to address specific issues, evaluating their effectiveness using ambiguous criteria over a limited timeframe may be unjust, particularly for impoverished households who depend on the program to cope with escalating expenses for food, fuel, and essential items.

However, the constant flow of assistance can also create a sense of dependence, potentially discouraging recipients from actively seeking employment or developing income-generating strategies. This trap of passivity, if not addressed, can impede their long-term climb out of poverty.

Internal Deception in PH Government

According to Tulfo (2022), several officials within the DSWD displayed indifference toward the government being deceived, as long as they could ensure the satisfaction of their families, friends, or acquaintances. Some of the funds may have been appropriated for personal gain. The 4Ps initiative is a catalyst for corruption within the DSWD. The idea for the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to involve the barangays in purging the list of undeserving beneficiaries under the 4Ps is flawed due to the prevalence of favoritism among barangay officials, who may even include fictitious beneficiaries under their jurisdiction.

Corruption, though present in every system, can be particularly devastating in a program targeting the most vulnerable. Instances of bribery, ghost beneficiaries, and misappropriation of funds erode public trust and divert resources away from those in dire need, deepening the wounds of poverty and injustice (Tulfo, 2022).

In line with this, one of the primary factors to be taken into account while putting the 4Ps program into practice is high-level political support for the initiative. Such political backing is essential since the 4Ps program necessitates collaboration between various government agencies, especially those that deal with social welfare, health, and education.

Discrimination of Beneficiaries

In relation to the economic domain, being a beneficiary often has a social stigma. Recipients may encounter prejudice and marginalization within their communities, being stigmatized as freeloaders who exploit the efforts of others (Tulfo, 2022). The stigma, which is based on misunderstandings about poverty and reliance, diminishes self-confidence and obstructs complete assimilation into society. Even the offspring of recipients might experience the full impact of this social stigma, including harassment and exclusion inside the educational system. The act of stigmatizing individuals in society with negative labels contributes to the continuous and harmful patterns of poverty, while also eroding the fundamental sense of worth and respect that the program aims to maintain.

4.3 Gaps in the Implementation of 4Ps

Beneficiaries Not Complying to Eligibility Criteria

There are requirements that a household must fulfill in order to be eligible for any grants under the 4Ps program. Generally speaking, a household must meet specific requirements in order to be eligible as a recipient or beneficiary of this program, as specified by the DSWD, the program's legal organization (Salva et al., 2023).

The poverty registry, known as Listahanan, has served as a crucial instrument for identifying recipients and enhancing the credibility of the 4Ps program. Some beneficiaries failed to meet all the conditions. The situation is worrisome because it may lead to noncompliance among certain household recipients, as indicated in Sections 11 and 12 of RA 11310. Furthermore, some recipients exhibited a deficiency in understanding the fundamental ideas of the 4Ps program.

Thus, according to dela Torre (2016), the eligibility system exhibited deficiencies, permitting the inclusion of unfit individuals as recipients and lacking comprehensiveness in encompassing all those who genuinely require assistance, particularly those without permanent residence or housing. Unqualified beneficiaries refer to those in the community who are considered wealthier than

the recipients themselves. This includes individuals who own substantial farms and lands, have professional occupations, and earn stable and higher monthly incomes.

Lapses in Selection Period

At the core of concerns lies the delicate issue of targeting and inclusion. Identifying the most vulnerable families remains a complex dance, fraught with limitations. Data inaccuracies and bureaucratic hurdles can create exclusion errors, leaving the truly destitute clinging to the brink of survival while aid flows elsewhere (Department of Social Welfare and Development, 2020). Conversely, the inclusion of ineligible beneficiaries dilutes the program's resources and undermines its effectiveness, leaving less for those who truly need it. This fosters resentment and a sense of injustice within excluded communities, jeopardizing the program's social legitimacy.

5. Comparative Analysis of the Efficiency in the Implementation of the WCS in Thailand and 4Ps in the Philippines Based on the Four Principles of New Public Administration Theory

Thailand and the Philippines, despite the fact of being considered as developing nations, face pervasive socioeconomic challenges which adversely affect the healthcare systems, education, and the overall standard of living of the citizens in both countries, making the efficiency of the operationalizations of the poverty alleviation initiatives of utmost significance. This section presents the comparative analysis of the efficiency of the WCS in Thailand and the 4Ps in the Philippines based on the four principles of new public administration theory: social equity, value-free, innovation and change, and public interest and citizen participation. By utilizing this theoretical perspective, the authors can present a comparative analysis of the efficiency of these two poverty-alleviation initiatives together with a new perspective based on the results of the analysis.

5.1 Social Equity

In Thailand, its Welfare Card System aims to provide subsidies for essential goods and services to low-income individuals, promoting social equity by ensuring fair access to basic necessities, essential resources, and services for all citizens, particularly those in vulnerable and marginalized sectors. However, challenges such as delays in card distribution and system errors, more specifically the inclusion-exclusion errors may hinder equitable access to benefits, highlighting areas for improvement. According to Phattarasukumjorn (2021), screening problems exist as people who are not actually poor are able to receive cards, and people who are actually poor are not able to receive cards making the Welfare Card System to not reach all target groups which somewhat fails to promote social equity.

Similarly, the 4Ps in the Philippines targets impoverished households with conditional cash transfers, aiming to alleviate poverty, improve education and health access, and enhance socio-economic conditions. While the program is designed to address social inequities, there are several challenges related to broader socio-economic factors that affect its implementation and outcomes. Accurately identifying and enrolling eligible households is a complex process. The program has faced challenges with both exclusion errors (eligible households not being included) and inclusion errors (ineligible households being included), which can undermine its effectiveness in promoting social equity. Moreover, according to Bongon (2015), there has been discrimination and bullying against the beneficiaries which entails that being part of the lists means experiencing the social stigma eroding the self-confidence of the beneficiaries.

5.2 Value-Free

The implementation of the Welfare Card System in Thailand reflects the values that are being prioritized by the government such as minimizing corruption, improving efficiency, and providing welfare benefits to those who are most in need. However, its implementation may not always adhere strictly to this principle as there may be biases or subjective judgments in the administration process, affecting how benefits are distributed and who receives them. In an article regarding the State Welfare Card Policy by Phattarasukumjorn (2021), it was emphasized that there is a possibility that the program is being used more as an avenue for fostering patronage relationships as it has been used to target specific groups of people for gains in short-term politics. This practice does not comply with the Value-Free principle of the new public administration theory which highlights that managers are not impartial and their objectives and ideals should be dedicated to social justice and management. In simple terms, although the implementation of the program in the country is rooted in values that aim to reduce poverty and help the marginalized sectors, there are parts of its implementation that highlight areas for improvement, more specifically the portion where the program is being used as a tool for patronage ties.

In the Philippines, the foundation of the 4Ps is rooted in value-laden goals—reducing poverty and improving health and education outcomes for children in low-income families. Using NPA, the 4Ps is designed to serve the needs of all eligible beneficiaries, regardless of political affiliations or socio-economic status. NPA places a strong emphasis on the value of democratic governance, making sure that initiatives like the 4Ps are sensitive to the interests and voices of the communities. Resources ought to be distributed with no corruption or money diversion in order to maximize benefits to the target population. Given the fact that the 4Ps is closely associated with institutionalized legislation and government norms, it appears that it does not follow the principle of value-free and value neutrality. Nevertheless, whatever form of deceit occurred

within the program, government officials are responsible for their actions and decisions as they are the ones that executed the program, starting with the national government down to the local government unit.

5.3 Innovation and Change

Thailand modernizes the implementation of its Welfare Card System with technology, enhancing efficiency and reducing fraud through electronic databases and biometric identification systems. The state welfare card offers cashless transactions allowing beneficiaries to purchase at authorized vendors. This innovative feature of the program implementation provides convenience reduces cash diversion and misuse, and promotes financial inclusion by allowing beneficiaries to access formal financial services via card. Other than that, the government also collaborated with different private sectors including banks and retailers in the operationalization of the initiative. The collaborations expand the reach of the program and offer better access to goods and services to the beneficiaries. Thailand's state welfare card implementation demonstrates a commitment to innovation in public service delivery, utilizing technology, partnerships, and data-driven approaches to improve welfare distribution efficiency.

NPA emphasizes a results-oriented approach that continuously seeks new and improved ways to deliver services. In the Philippines, according to the Landbank of the Philippines (n.d), LANDBANK has made it easier and more convenient for the 4Ps beneficiaries to access their benefits. Since 2008, LANDBANK, in partnership with DSWD, has distributed cash grants for the 4Ps beneficiaries via different modes of payment: (a) LANDBANK Cash Cards, (b) FCB PITAKArds, and (c) Conduits such as Rural Banks and Cooperatives). Grant recipients have safe and easy access to cash grants through LANDBANK, an authorized government depository bank. This emphasizes that the 4Ps implemented electronic payment mechanisms, including cash cards and mobile money transfers, to provide cash grants to beneficiaries in an efficient and secure manner. This unique strategy lowers transaction costs, decreases leakage, and assures that qualified households receive payments on time which demonstrates commitment to innovation and change.

5.4 Public Interest and Citizen Participation

In Thailand, the implementation of its Welfare Card System already serves the public interest as it helps the public, more specifically the poor, in alleviating poverty. Aside from that, the operationalization of the program requires citizen participation for its effectiveness, accountability, and responsiveness to the population's needs. For Thailand's Welfare Card System to be implemented in a way that promotes accountability, transparency, and beneficiary needs-responsiveness, citizen participation is crucial. Through proactive citizen engagement during the implementation process, policymakers may optimize the

efficacy of the program and guarantee that it genuinely caters to the needs of the target community further promoting the delivery of service for public interest.

In the Philippines, by eliminating poverty and advancing human development, using the NPA framework, the 4Ps is intended to serve the public interest. The 4Ps's efforts to enhance democratic governance, equity, and accountability are highlighted by an analysis of public interest and citizen involvement utilizing the NPA framework. The program seeks to enhance the well-being of underprivileged individuals and contribute to the larger societal objectives of social justice and poverty alleviation by offering conditional cash transfers to qualified families. Moreover, according to Dungog-Cuizon, Cuizon, and Jardin (2021), the 4Ps is considered decentralized because of the role of the LGUs in identifying the pockets of poverty in which areas are being shortlisted by DSWD. Decentralization of administrative procedures is being practiced and utilized in the 4Ps, which range from the national government down to the local government unit, to improve and accelerate the delivery of public services that are human-centered and efficient. The concerns of the individuals are taken into consideration by the program, which also serves to highlight the responsiveness and provide the individuals the opportunity to voice their concerns regarding the programs that are being imposed by the government.

6. Conclusion

This study explores the implementation of the Welfare Card System in Thailand and the 4Ps in the Philippines as poverty alleviation initiatives in both countries. Using the lens of the new public administration theory, the comparative analysis showed that while both initiatives adhere with the principles of the theory, it also highlights lapses in Thailand's WCS and the Philippines' 4Ps, revealing the negligence in some aspects of the implementation of these initiatives that eventually contribute to its ineffectiveness in alleviating poverty.

In understanding the operationalizations of these two poverty alleviation initiatives in Thailand and the Philippines, the new public administration theory highlights four fundamental principles: social equity, value-free, innovation and change, and public interest and citizen participation. Social equity aims to guarantee equitable access to resources and services, especially to the marginalized groups; value-laden highlights the absence of personal biases and subjective values of the administrators when implementing programs and initiatives; innovation and change prioritizes on the innovative feature in adapting the evolving and changing needs of the beneficiaries towards a more improved public service delivery; and the public interest and citizen participation highlights the importance of people-centric approach in implementing programs and initiatives. Through the lens of the new public administration framework, the WCS and 4Ps helped in addressing the issues of poverty in both countries, but

despite the fact that these initiatives achieved their immediate objectives, the comparative analysis shows that there are areas that need more attention. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the role of collaborative work among the different actors such as the civil society organizations, government agencies, and public administrators to expand the reach of these initiatives and genuinely serve the people. More importantly, the analysis demonstrates that the goal of eliminating poverty in both countries will remain a dream as long as public administrators and government officials do not acknowledge the lived realities of the people on ground to evaluate the efficiency of these initiatives. Applying the principles of social equity, value-free, innovation and change, and public interest and citizen participation in the actual implementation of these initiatives will be crucial in contributing to the efficiency of the programs. Therefore, the main focus is to enhance the operational effectiveness of WCS and 4Ps to guarantee the long-term efficacy of these initiatives and to address the systemic challenges in their implementation.

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Unveiling Gendered Chains: A Comparative Case Study of Women's Political Representation in Thailand and the Philippines

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Abstract

Thailand and the Philippines exhibit unique challenges for women in public office. Considering the number of women elected in office, the underrepresentation of women in both governments poses a concern. Thus, the main question is, what are the commonalities and differences in women's political representation in Thailand and the Philippines? To answer the inquiry, this study conducts archival research and employs an Intersectional Feminist framework to shed light on the multifaceted ways in which gender norms intersect with women's journeys into politics. The objectives of this study are as follows: (1) To analyze the state of women's political representation including the number of women in elected offices in both countries, (2) to compare and contrast the findings between Thailand and the Philippines to highlight commonalities and differences in women's political representation, and (3) to examine intersecting identities such as affect women's political representation. Using the intersectional approach, this paper found that women's political representation in Thailand and the Philippines is influenced by the inter-relationship of gender, socioeconomic status, and other identities while trying to negotiate space for their inclusion in the practice of politics. With that, this study not only exposes the roots of women's underrepresentation in politics but also calls for transformative change. It highlights the importance of adopting an Intersectional Feminist perspective to challenge existing norms and advocate for meaningful inclusion of women in decision-making processes.

Keywords Women, Political Representation, Patriarchy, Thailand, Philippines

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1. Introduction

Since the start of the 21st century, achieving gender equality worldwide, especially in politics, remains an unmet objective. Gender inequality has proven to be a difficult problem to overcome as it lingers everywhere and is a hindrance to social progress (United Nations, n.d.). While there have been strides in several regions of Asia, women's capacity to engage as decision-makers in politics remains constrained. One may ask, "Where are the women in politics?" Women's political participation is an essential prerequisite for achieving gender equality and genuine democracy. It helps promote the involvement of women in public decision-making and is an avenue that guarantees accountability to women (UN Women, n.d.-a). In recent years, women have been leaving their mark in the field of politics. During the 2016 presidential elections in the United States of America, Hillary Clinton was vying to become the first female president of the country in her race against Donald Trump. While Clinton did lose her campaign, the journey for women to gain the top government posts in the United States did not end there. Just five years later, the country would bear witness to its first female vice president: Kamala Harris. Harris, who won alongside Joe Biden as president, is also known to be the first Black American and South Asian American to be elected to the position (The White House, n.d.). In New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern gained the distinction of being her country's youngest prime minister and was able to create a government with diverse members including women, people of color, indigenous people, and members of the LGBTQ community (Pannett, 2023). Additionally, Ardern's empathetic leadership style and her innovative tactics in handling the COVID-19 situation in her country have been lauded (Friedman, 2020). These women have shown that men are not the only ones capable of leading. Therefore, one must recognize the importance of women and their political representation.

Different cultures often assign specific roles and values to men and women, influencing their perceived roles in political participation. For instance, cultures that emphasize traditional gender roles might discourage women from actively engaging in politics, while others with more progressive values might encourage equal participation. According to Bigler and Liben (2007), the heavy emphasis on gender within our cultural norms strengthens gender stereotypes. Occupational roles are examples of male and female behavior that are derived from culture's traditions. In professions like law enforcement, the military, and politics, there's often a higher representation of men compared to women. Conversely, in care-oriented fields like child care, health care, and social work, women tend to outnumber men (Worthy et al., 2020). With that, this study acknowledges the impact of patriarchal norms that affect women's political participation. Thailand and the Philippines present unique challenges and opportunities for women in public office. Both nations boast rich cultural histories and distinctive trajectories in women's socio-political advancement. Exploring their different historical backgrounds, and political

structures serves as a prism through which to discern the varying degrees of women's agency, access, and representation in politics. With that, this paper aims to do the following: First, it aims to analyze the state of women's political representation, including the number of women elected offices in both countries. Second, it intends to compare and contrast the findings between Thailand and the Philippines to highlight commonalities and differences in women's political representation. Third and lastly, it seeks to examine the underlying patriarchal norms that affect Thai and Filipino women's participation in politics. For the analysis, this paper employs an Intersectional Feminist framework to understand the dynamics of women's political representation in Thailand and the Philippines, focusing on how deeply rooted patriarchal structures impact their participation within diverse historical, electoral, and political contexts.

For the conduct of the study, this study employs archival research for its methodology. Archival research utilizes books, journals, and other records or data available in storage (American Psychological Association, 2018). It involves a wide variety of proceedings to further the analysis of documents and materials including historical documents and digital texts (Ventresca & Mohr, 2002). This type of method was chosen as investigating already existing data concerning women's political representation in Thailand and the Philippines would be the most feasible way to conduct the study. Performing interviews could not be attainable due to the limitations of the researchers' capacity concerning time, location and finance. Grounded in secondary data, this study investigates how pervasive traditional gender norms and identities such as socioeconomic status, religion, and disability intersect and constrain women's participation and representation in political spheres in these two Southeast Asian nations.

This paper, divided into 7 parts, investigates the gender roles that shape women's experiences within the realm of political careers in Thailand and the Philippines. In the first section, the paper provided the outline of the study. In the second section, the study explains the theory of Intersectional Feminism and how it is utilized in the analysis of women's political representation in Thailand and the Philippines. In the third section, the political situation of women in Thailand is discussed in terms of the historical background, the electoral system and election of women in the country, and the direct participation of women. In the fourth section, the state of women's political representation in Filipino society is examined through the historical background, the electoral system and the election of women in the country, and the direct participation of women. In the fifth section, the comparative analysis of women's political representation in Thailand and the Philippines is investigated through the lens of Intersectional Feminist theory. In the sixth section, the future prospects of women's political representation in Thailand and the Philippines are presented. Lastly, in the seventh section, the article will end with its conclusion.

2. The Intersectional Feminism Framework

Focusing solely on gender-based discrimination overlooks the various factors contributing to the marginalization of women impacted by poverty and exclusion, both locally and globally. This includes the impacts of colonization on Indigenous women and the effects of globalization on women in disadvantaged countries. Gender alone is insufficient for understanding the intersection of power dynamics shaping women's experiences (Canadian Institute for the Advancement of Women, 2006). In turn, Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the concept of intersectionality in 1989, which represents the idea that various forms of discrimination and oppression intersect and overlap and creates unique experiences for individuals who belong to multiple marginalized groups (Tong & Botts, 2018). Intersectionality, when applied as a theory of feminism, creates a framework that prioritizes the perspectives of individuals facing various forms of discrimination simultaneously and comprehends the depths of inequalities and their relationship within a specific setting (UN Women, 2020). With that, this study employs an intersectional feminism framework through which this paper acknowledges and analyzes how different intersecting factors such as gender, class, ethnicity, and cultural norms influence women's experiences, particularly in terms of political representation.

Intersectional feminism distinguishes itself from other feminist theories like Liberal, Marxist-Socialist, Radical, and Women of Color Feminisms by emphasizing the interconnectedness of various social identities and systems of oppression. While Liberal Feminism focuses on achieving gender equality through legal reforms, Marxist-Socialist feminism analyzes gender oppression through the lens of class and capitalism, and Radical Feminism targets patriarchy as the fundamental source of women's oppression, Women of Color feminism highlights the specific experiences of women of color by addressing the dual oppressions of race and gender (Tong & Botts, 2018). Influenced by the broader traditions of black feminist thought and women of color feminism, Intersectional Feminism integrates the aforementioned perspectives but goes further by recognizing that individuals experience overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination and privilege based on a combination of factors, thus advocating for a more comprehensive approach to understanding and addressing inequality. Using Intersectional Feminist Framework (IFFs), social categories like race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and citizenship among others are understood as interconnected and mutually reinforcing, rather than as isolated or independent factors (Canadian Institute for the Advancement of Women, 2006).

In the context of Thai and Philippine women's political representation, an intersectional feminist perspective can provide a deeper understanding of the unique challenges and opportunities faced by women in these countries. Through this framework, the issues of political representation experienced by women in Thailand

and the Philippines are seen not solely based on gender. Instead, other factors such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religion, and regional disparities also play significant roles. Moreover, both economic and social/cultural aspects of inclusion and exclusion are taken into account in relation to citizenship and the formation of nations. Through IFF, problems can be redefined as "failure to include" rather than "failure to integrate" (Canadian Institute for the Advancement of Women, 2006).

3. Political Situation of Women in Thailand

3.1 Historical Background of Women's Political Participation

Throughout the dynastic periods in Thailand, Thai culture has favored hierarchical setups and a patriarchal system, where men predominantly occupied influential roles in politics and governance. The embedded representations of gender roles and power dynamics in Thai culture emphasize male leadership over female subservience, as encapsulated in aphorisms such as the comparison to the "hind legs of an elephant," symbolizing men as the forelegs and women as the hind legs. Another illustrative saying is "Wives are like thread and follow the needle," (Jermsittiparsert, 2016), both conveying the notion of women holding an inferior status, subject to the absolute control of their male counterparts (Jose & Alfaro, 2021). Hence, Thai women, regardless of their societal origins, held a lower status than men. On the political front, women, particularly those in the royal court, were often utilized as political tools. In instances of war, a lady of the court might be taken hostage, or she could be compelled to marry someone from another state to achieve specific political objectives (Kaithong & Sawangdee, 2018). Moreover, men, in ancient Thai society, were expected and accepted as heads of the family, while women's roles revolved around taking care of the household (Sopchokchai, 1998). Hence, political roles were primarily confined to men.

Before exposure to Western influence, education for Thai girls, particularly those from upper-class families, primarily occurred within the inner courts of the royal family. Upon ascending the throne as King Rama V, Chulalongkorn westernized Thailand across various domains and emphasized the pivotal role of education in human development, leading to the establishment of a modern school in 1871 that catered to the education of male members of the royal family and nobility's sons. Three years later, a school for upper-class women was established (Kaithong & Sawangdee, 2018). Over two decades later, the initial Thai female students were admitted to Chulalongkorn University, the country's inaugural university. This access to formal education created opportunities for women to receive professional training. Consequently, Thailand witnessed the emergence of upper-class educated women engaging in social and philanthropic endeavors (Sopchokchai, 1998). This involvement marked the start of women's groups as a form of political participation. Additionally, interaction with Western nations

during this era introduced ideas of democracy, equal rights, and liberty to Thai society.

In the early 20th century, Thai women began engaging in social and political movements, advocating for suffrage and equal rights. Thailand granted women the right to vote in local elections in 1932, the same year as the Siamese Revolution that transformed the country's political landscape. Even though women obtained voting rights, they were limited to participating in village elections only after 1982 (Bowie, 2010). While achieving female suffrage in national elections is often considered the pinnacle of democratic establishment, obtaining voting rights at the local level has been equally challenging and sometimes occurred after national electoral rights. The initial participation of women in national parliamentary elections post-1932 didn't result from the struggle for female suffrage but marked Thailand's shift from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy (Bowie, 2008).

However, despite being among the pioneering women in Asia to achieve suffrage, their political standing saw limited change. It was not until 1949 that the first woman was elected to parliament. Subsequently, in the 1952 elections, four women secured positions. In 1955, a law mandating parliamentary candidates to be affiliated with political parties was introduced, narrowing the space for women. In the ensuing 1957 election, only one woman was elected (Iwanaga, 2005). Over the five decades from 1949 to 2000, women's representation saw minimal growth, maintaining low participation in electoral politics despite consistently exercising their right to vote.

3.2 Electoral System and the Election of Women in Thailand

While some parts of the Thai government are selected through democratic elections, such as the House of Representatives, local administrations, and the Governorship of Bangkok, the electoral system in Thailand, as outlined in the 2017 Constitution, maintains a constitutional monarchy where the King has authority over the appointment of a regent and possesses the veto power over legislation (Bangprapa, 2017). The executive branch selection process is similar to the 2007 Constitution, with the Prime Minister chosen from the House of Representatives and appointed by the King (Constitutionet, 2021). The legislature comprises a bicameral National Assembly, consisting of a House of Representatives with 500 members, where 350 members are directly elected and 150 members are elected from party lists, and a Senate with 200 members, appointed as dictated by Organic Act on Installation of Senators (Constitutionet, 2021).

There have been significant institutional and cultural advancements that have facilitated women in Thailand to pursue political leadership roles. Some political parties, such as the Democrat Party, the Future Forward Party (now Move Forward Party), and the Action Coalition Party, have implemented voluntary gender quotas, which encouraged women to run as party list candidates. However, only a small number of political parties choose to implement an electoral quota to ensure

equal representation of women and men candidates. Since the quota is not obligatory, parties do not have a strong motivation to enforce it, as they perceive it as increasing the expenses associated with political activities (Sinpeng & Savirani, 2022). In 2021, constitutional amendments in Thailand changed the voting system, notably increasing the number of single-member constituency seats from 350 to 400. These seats are determined through a first-past-the-post voting system, where the candidate with the highest number of votes in each constituency wins. Additionally, the amendments reintroduced a dual-ballot system, allowing each voter to cast two ballots—one for a preferred constituency candidate and another for a political party (Jatusripitak, 2022).

The Royal Thai Government, recognizing the need for enhanced gender equality, implemented a set of ambitious "MDG-Plus" targets to surpass international agreements and further advance human development. Specifically, one of Thailand's MDG-Plus targets aimed to double the proportion of women in national parliament, local government bodies, and executive positions within the civil service by 2006. This commitment was originally established in the Ninth Women's Development Plan for 2002-2006, reflecting the government's dedication to fostering greater women's participation in political and decision-making roles (United Nations, 2006). At this point, it is evident that Thailand fell short of achieving the MDG-Plus target for gender equality. From the parliamentary election in February 2005 until the present, the opportunity to double the proportion of women MPs in Thailand has not materialized. Aside from that, Thailand does not have specific legislation mandating quotas or measures for women's representation and participation in politics. The representation of women in politics is generally governed by electoral laws and political party regulations.

3.3 Women's Direct Participation in Thailand

Women in Thailand hold positions across various levels of government, including parliament, local administrative bodies, and ministerial roles. In the late 1990s, several new institutions were established, marking a significant transformation in the country's political landscape. The 1997 constitution stands out as a crucial milestone in Thailand's democratization, leading to substantial changes in the parliament and electoral system (Iwanaga, 2005). Notably, this constitution has laid the groundwork for gender rights, with Article 30 explicitly stating equal rights for both women and men. This marks an initial stride toward providing women with increased opportunities in the predominantly male-dominated political sphere. However, women's representation remains below the desired level. With that, this segment delves into the state of direct political participation among women in Thailand, encompassing candidacy in elections and occupying administrative positions that facilitate decision-making and policy formulation at both national and local levels.

Thailand operates as a constitutional monarchy with King Maha Vajiralongkorn serving as the reigning monarch and head of state. During post-1993, women held positions across various levels of government, including parliament, local administrative bodies, and ministerial roles. This marks an initial stride toward women's increased opportunities in the predominantly male-dominated political sphere. However, women's representation remains below the desired level. In its executive branch, men have predominantly dominated throughout Thai history, with Yingluck Shinawatra being the only exception as the first female Prime Minister. Yingluck was elected into office in 2011 and made history by becoming the first woman to hold the position (Kate, 2011). Despite her success as a businesswoman, Yingluck's rise to power is notable within the context of a broader pattern of male dominance in Thai politics. Moreover, in terms of the Thai cabinet, there are 34 ministers from six parties with 29 men and 5 women after the 2023 General Election (Morris & Nguyen, 2023).

As for the upper house, the Senate in Thailand is not directly elected by the public; instead, its members are selected by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and appointed by the King. This method of appointment has been part of the political landscape, particularly after the 2014 coup d'état. As of 2023, there is a notable gender disparity in the composition of the Thai Senate. Out of the 250 senators, only 26 are women, accounting for 10.40% of the total (The Nation, 2023). The House of Representatives, on the other hand, is composed of 500 members where 350 members are directly elected by constituents through a first-past-the-post voting system in single-member constituencies, while the remaining 150 members are chosen from party lists. In the 2023 election, there has been a notable improvement in the representation of women in parliament compared to the previous elections in 2019. Out of the total 500 seats in parliament, 96 are now held by women, which translates to a representation of 19 percent, marking a significant increase (Suwannarat, 2023). However, despite the positive increase in the number of women elected to parliament in the 2023 elections, men maintain a significant majority within the House of Representatives.

In the judiciary branch, a historic milestone was achieved when women concurrently assumed the two most senior positions in Thailand's largest court system, the Courts of Justice, in October 2020. Breaking gender barriers, this momentous occasion witnessed a woman becoming the President of the Supreme Court for the first time, and only the second time a woman assumed the presidency of the Appeal Courts (Bishop, 2022). While the concurrent appointments were a notable step towards gender inclusivity, the broader representation within the judiciary still leans heavily towards men.

In terms of women's political participation at the local level, there has been a shift in women's engagement in fostering local communities and villages. Historically, this responsibility was entirely assumed by men, but now there's a notable increase in women's involvement in local development initiatives.

However, the representation of women in higher positions within provincial and local governments remains notably lower. In the 2019 General elections, there was just one female governor among the 76 provinces, constituting only 1.32%. Female Chiefs of Provincial Administrative Organizations (PAO) stand at 8%, and for Sub-district Administrative Organizations (SAO), the representation of female leaders accounts for 6.45% (UN Women, n.d.-b). This data highlights the disparity in women's representation in higher-level administrative roles despite their increasing involvement in community development at the grassroots level.

However, despite some success stories in Thai politics, women continue to encounter various forms of discrimination. According to Ruengrawee Pichaikul, director of the Gender and Development Research Institute, women in Thai politics still face various obstacles, including sexual violence and online harassment. She cites an alarming incident where a male candidate digitally altered a female opponent's image onto a nude model to tarnish her reputation and undermine her popularity. Pichaikul emphasizes that many women face cyberbullying, particularly on platforms like Facebook. Moreover, she notes that during the 2019 election, political parties exacerbated the situation by objectifying women, prioritizing physical attractiveness over intellect and the advocacy they represent (Nachemson, 2023). The National Seminar on Promoting Women's Leadership and Political Participation in 2018 also affirms that gender inequality and discrimination persist in Thai society and politics. Women experience sexual remarks, defamation, privacy violations, intimidation, threats, hate speeches, and other forms of violence, making a political career unattractive and instilling fear in women considering entering politics (UN Women, n.d.-c). It is also important to note that most Thai women who participated in political and economic activities belong to the upper class. According to Sinpeng and Savirani (2022), women who come from political families may have an edge in seeking political leadership, although success is uncertain. Elite women politicians who indicated encountering no obstacles in their path to becoming political leaders typically have close connections to political parties. These women belong to political dynasties or hold significant roles in the business and media sectors (Sinpeng & Savirani, 2022). Moreover, financial resources have become a deciding factor as election campaigns in Thailand, despite limits set by the National Election Commission, are expensive. Women, lacking financial means, often face obstacles due to these circumstances. While there is limited reliable data on campaign fund usage under the new system, it is probable that significant funds are required for a candidate to succeed (Iwanaga, 2005). Lastly, female candidates have faced difficulty in winning voter approval due to some stereotypes related to the theme. According to Iwanaga (2005), some female parliamentarians faced challenges in being perceived as credible and were frequently targeted with demeaning comments and derogatory remarks. To win over voters, they needed to prove their capabilities and exhibit traditionally masculine qualities.

4. State of Women's Political Representation in Filipino Society

4.1 Historical Background of Women's Political Participation in the Philippines

The Philippines has its fair share of history to tell when it comes to its women and their political participation. It is important to note that during the pre-colonial era of the country, women played an important role not just in politics but in society as a whole. Before the arrival of the Spanish campaign in the Philippines, the babaylan played a major role in the community. The babaylan were female mystical healers who carried political and social power (Hega et al., 2017). The role was perceived as an equal to the datu (chief) and can be given to transgender people and gay men (Ildefonso, 2023). The babaylans served as proof of the reverence that was given to women at the time, but their dominance was wiped out with the arrival of the Spaniards (Limos, 2019).

The status of women during the Spanish occupation of the Philippines was severely relegated compared to the pre-colonial times. Their main purpose was to serve as child bearers and they did not engage in political activities as these were considered exclusive to men (Santos, 1991, as cited in Aguja, 2013). The eventual arrival of the Americans did not make things any better. The exploitation of women became rampant as it was made to be legalized and institutionalized (Agustin, 1987). However, the women of the Philippines were not so easily silenced even under colonial rule. The women in the Katipunan and Malolos (a city in the province of Bulacan) helped in the future consciousness-raising among women (Santos, 1991, as cited in Aguja, 2013).

At this juncture, one may be pondering as to how the Filipino women are involved in a more modern form of government. In the Philippines, women were granted the right to vote in the year 1937. However, this was not without its obstacles. The Constitution of 1935 specified that suffrage would only be extended to women if 300,000 of them were in favor of it during a plebiscite (Hega, 2003). Filipino women leaders rallied women from all sectors and were able to have 447,725 women vote “yes” to suffrage (Umali, 2021). This part of history is a prime example of how Filipino women are willing to fight for what is their right. In modern times, notable women have been involved in political positions and/or events. To name a few: Corazon Aquino's rise to the presidency not only made her the first female Filipino president, but it also marked the end of Ferdinand Marcos Sr.'s dictatorship. Another remarkable woman is Leila de Lima. She has been put to jail by former president Rodrigo Duterte as she is known to be a vocal critic of Duterte's “war on drugs” but has recently been released on bail.

4.2 Electoral System and the Election of Women in the Philippines

The electoral system of the Philippines is quite simple. The country has adopted a plurality system wherein the candidate with the highest number of votes wins the position they are running for (Wong, 2022). Elections occurring within the

Philippines will allow citizens to choose a president, a vice president, 12 senators, 300 lower house legislators, and approximately 18,000 officials across various islands (Petty, 2022). While the country practices such an electoral system, Philippine politics is dominated by men. Data from election years from 1998 to 2013 exhibit that more men participate and win in the elections than women (Commission on Elections, n.d., as cited in Rodriguez, 2016). Moreover, the combination of the "first-past-the-post" electoral system in the Philippines and the absence of strong political parties hinders women from participating in politics. Without party discipline and established rules within parties, the consideration of internal party procedures for the inclusion of women in the party's candidate list is not even possible (Encinas-Franco, 2021). To address the issue of the lack of women in government, the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 9710, or "An Act Providing for the Magna Carta of Women" in 2009. One of its provisions is to increase the number of women in third-level positions in government to reach a "fifty-fifty" gender balance in the year 2014 (Congress of the Philippines, 2009). By January 2014, women began to take up approximately 42% of third-level positions in government which is still short of its fifty-fifty gender balance goal. (Philippine Commission on Women, n.d., as cited in Rodriguez, 2016).

4.3 Women's Direct Participation in the Philippines

The Philippines has mostly evolved past the Spanish colonial mindset of having women stay at home and let them only serve as child bearers. The country has a reputation for adopting a liberal and progressive Constitution, where Article II Section 14 acknowledges the role of women in nation-building (Hega, 2003). Notably, Republic Act 7192 is dedicated to the acknowledgment of the role of women in developing the nation. It provides benefits such as setting aside funds for women's activities, assuring the involvement of women in the development process, and removing gender biases. Fortunately, women have served and are serving in the Philippine government. According to an article by the Civil Service Commission (2020), their inventory of government human resources has shown that females compose 50.88% of the overall 1,728,641 government workers while males only comprise 49.12%. However, it should be said that the same article notes that the men hold first-level positions while the women are in second-level positions.

The Philippine national government consists of three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. In the Philippines' history, only two women have had the honor of holding the highest position in the land as president. These two being Corazon Aquino and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Fascinatingly, both of these women rose to the presidency after the revolutions. Aquino became the first female president of the country in 1986 after ousting the dictator, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., through the People Power Revolution (Alexander, 2019). The second woman who would become president was Arroyo, who gained presidential powers in 2001 during the aftermath of the EDSA II Revolution which saw the impeachment trial

of President Joseph Estrada (Council of Women World Leaders, n.d.). In the vice presidency, three women have been able to serve in that position: Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Leni Robredo, and Sara Duterte. For cabinet ministers, women make up 26% (Abad, 2023). However, it should be noted that women as cabinet officials usually hold areas that are associated with females including health, tourism, and social welfare (Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 2018).

In the legislative branch of the Philippine government, the Senate and the House of Representatives fall under it. In numbers, there shall only be 24 senators and there are no more than 250 seats in the House of Representatives unless fixed by law (Official Gazette, n.d.-b). Currently in the 19th Congress, seven out of 24 senators are women, namely: Loren Legarda, Risa Hontiveros, Nancy Binay, Pia Cayetano, Imee Marcos, Grace Poe, and Cynthia Villar. With this, the Senate still consists of men as the majority. Data has shown that while men have indeed dominated Congress since 2001, there has been an increase in the number of women from the years 2004 to 2016 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016, as cited in UP sa Halalan, 2019). It expounds that women had the highest percentage of members in the Senate in 2013 with 33.3% and the House of Representatives in 2016 with 28.6% compared to previous years.

Under the judicial branch of the Philippine government lies the Supreme Court and the lower courts (Official Gazette, n.d.-a). Two women have been able to serve as chief justice of the country. The first woman to hold the chief justice position is Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno who was appointed by the late President Benigno Aquino III in 2012. The other and second woman who was able to get in the position is Teresita de Castro who was appointed in 2018 by Rodrigo Duterte.

At the local level, the numbers are still in favor of the men compared to the women. In 2016, women formed the minority 23.2% became mayors, 19.8% became vice mayors and 21.4% were councilors as compared to their male counterparts (PSA, 2016, as cited in David et al., 2019). Regrettably, even with women at least being present in the government, it is still an underrepresentation of their voices. The Philippine government at the local level is still vastly dominated by men. The country still has a long way to go regarding women being proportionate or even outnumbering men.

The experiences of Filipino women in power have been well documented and are not painted in a good light. A prime example would be the chaotic dynamic between then Vice President Leni Robredo and the former president, Rodrigo Duterte. Robredo has never gotten along well with the president she served under. Duterte called Robredo a “scatterbrain” who could not be trusted with state secrets and fired her from her post as the head of his drug war less than three weeks after being appointed (Al Jazeera, 2019). The former vice president has been a known critic of Duterte's war on drugs due to the number of deaths (Reuters, 2019). There is no shortage of instances of misogyny in their tenure as president and vice president. Duterte has teased Robredo about a supposed “boyfriend” (Gonzales,

2016), admitted to staring at her knees during cabinet meetings (Ramos, 2016), and described her as “weak” (Mariano, 2018). Unfortunately, even Robredo’s family was not exempted from the attacks. During her 2022 presidential campaign, Robredo’s eldest daughter became a victim of being tied to fake sex videos that were spread through social media (Lalu, 2022). On the other hand, Sara Duterte, the current vice president of the country and daughter of Rodrigo Duterte, presents herself in a different way than Robredo does. Duterte portrays herself as a tough kind of leader, which is contradictory to the feminine display that is associated with Robredo. However, this has not spared her from the existing misogyny in the country. She has been ridiculed for her masculine image, her being a rape survivor, and was even told by her father not to join the presidential race as it is “not a job for women” (Regalado, 2022). Another major female political figure in the Philippines who would be subjected to misogynistic attacks would be former Senator Leila de Lima. As a fierce critic of Duterte’s war on drugs, de Lima has been a target of the former president. Duterte has publicized de Lima’s relationship with her driver/bodyguard and attempted to intimidate her by releasing a supposed “sex tape” of the two (Ranada, 2016). What is more bizarre and fouler about the situation are the comments and events that came after it. Former Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez has been noted to say that he had no qualms about displaying the supposed private video between de Lima and her driver if it proves their relationship (Cepeda, 2016). While no video was shown during a congressional inquiry, narrations of it still popped up despite De Lima saying that it had nothing to do with the accusations that she is connected to illegal drugs (Elemia, 2016).

The struggle of women in being elected to government positions stems from varying factors. One of which comes from the differing acceptance from social classes. When asked if women are as capable as men in performing as President of the Philippines, the class in most agreement with the statement are those from the poorest in socioeconomic status (Mangahas, 1998, as cited in Macapagal, 2006). It was found out that the lower one goes in the socioeconomic classes, the more likely that class is to be in agreement with the statement (Mangahas, 1998, as cited in Macapagal, 2006). The reason for this being that perceptions are hinged on the subjective meaning which one connects to a situation (Ross & Nisbett, 1991, as cited in Macapagal, 2006). In another study, women politicians are regarded as “weak” in solving issues (Aguilar, 1990, as cited in Macapagal, 2006). The study adds other insights on women politicians include being unable to bear a crisis, being unable to make the “tough” decisions, inability to perform well due to possible pregnancy, and more. Other challenges include insufficient funds to campaign and the lack of established connections with political leaders, and competing with others who have a substantial national reputation (Aguilar, 1990; Cuanan-Angsioco, 2000, as cited in Choi, 2018). Historically, in the year 2004, two women political parties went up against 64 party list groups where the women’s party, Gabriela, won a seat in the House of Representatives for the first time and has since held on to two seats

since 2007 (Choi, 2018). On the other side of the conversation, coming from an elite socioeconomic background proves to be advantageous for Filipino women entering into politics. Family ties have been a crucial aspect for a woman's political career, which also undermines their role to represent (Veneracion-Rallonza, 2008, as cited in Choi, 2018). In the Philippines' 14th Congress, 15% of the congresswomen were wives of previous congressmen (Choi, 2018). However, as a recent study would show, women politicians have been able to transcend some of these obstacles. Critically, in recent years, more Filipino women enter into politics even without being related to male politicians by their own efforts and excellence (Salvador, 2017).

5. Comparative Analysis

Comparing the roots and the current status of women's political engagement in the Philippines and Thailand reveals both parallels and distinctions. When considering the historical position of women, it becomes evident that in earlier times, Filipino women experienced a more egalitarian standing in society, whereas Thai women occupied a subordinate social position, largely influenced by cultural and religious factors. On their respective electoral systems, Thailand and the Philippines are distinct with the former's King having major influence on its elections while the latter is dependent on its citizens in electing officials. Nonetheless, both countries attempted to solve gender disparity issues in their respective governments through different solutions. One of the goals of Thailand's MDG-Plus was to increase the percentage of women in government, whereas the Philippines' Republic Act No. 9710 aimed to increase the number of women in third-level positions in government. However, the number of women elected in both countries proves that these solutions did not succeed. Lastly, on women's direct participation, a few notable women in both Thailand and the Philippines were able to break through the gender glass ceilings to hold positions at a national level in their country's respective governments. However, at a local level, there is a sizable difference in the proportional gap between the men and the women in office.

While the underrepresentation of women in the political sphere is seen as a result of patriarchal norms and gender stereotypes, it is important to note that women experience multiple burdens which also hinder them from joining the political arena. By utilizing the lens of intersectional feminism framework, the underrepresentation of women in political bodies cannot be attributed to a single cause. Women in most political systems face three obstacles when trying to secure a seat in parliament: eligibility, selection, and election. The process of recruiting lawmakers depends on individuals who are both interested in politics and have the means to participate, willing to run for office, and ultimately chosen by decision-makers as candidates for election (Norris, 1997, as cited by Iwanaga, 2005). In terms of eligibility, this study found that women in both countries share similar challenges

- they lack the financial resources needed to engage in politics. Election campaigns are expensive, and women from lower socioeconomic backgrounds face greater hurdles in gathering the necessary funds. Women, like Yingluck Shinawatra from Thailand, and Corazon Aquino and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo from the Philippines, who came from political families or elite backgrounds have a significant advantage due to established connections and resources.

In terms of selection, women have been hesitant to participate in electoral politics due to their perception of the political environment. A woman's perspective on politics is crucial if she is considering running for office. In Thailand, there is a common belief that women are too morally upright to engage in the "dirty" game of politics (Iwanaga, 2005). In the Philippines, there are pervasive stereotypes that women are unable to make tough decisions or perform well due to potential pregnancy and other gendered assumptions about their abilities (Aguilar, 1990, as cited in Macapagal, 2006). These assumptions have been used as a rationale by females to avoid entering the political arena. Moreover, the process of selecting potential candidates also involves choosing individuals by the party. In Thailand, political parties, like the Democrat Party, the Future Forward Party (now Move Forward Party), and the Action Coalition Party, have implemented voluntary gender quotas to encourage women to run as party list candidates. However, these quotas are not mandatory, resulting in limited enforcement. The political party system in the Philippines poses a barrier to women's participation in politics for several reasons. Firstly, the "first-past-the-post" electoral system used in the country tends to favor larger, more established parties, making it difficult for smaller or newer parties – which may be more supportive of gender equality – to gain traction. Additionally, the lack of well-developed political parties in the Philippines means that there may be limited opportunities for women to access the resources and support necessary to run for office, which result to a minimal impact on increasing women's representation (Sinpeng & Savirani, 2022). Lastly, in terms of election, gender stereotyping creates obstacles for women attempting to be elected because voters discriminate against female candidates. According to Iwanaga (2005), discriminatory gender stereotypes held by voters can hinder the success of female candidates. Women politicians in the Philippines are regarded as “weak” (Aguilar, 1990, as cited in Macapagal, 2006), while women in Thailand are seen as secondary or subordinate sex and only men are seen as the leaders of society (Tantiwiramanond & Pandey, 1987). These voters’ stereotype view of gender has a negative impact for female entry in politics.

Although women in the Philippines and Thailand face unique forms of discrimination and challenges, it is evident that those from lower socio-economic backgrounds in both countries are disproportionately marginalized. These women not only grapple with economic inequalities but also encounter gender-based discrimination that limits their political representation. According to Jose and Alfaro (2021), the economic transformations in Thailand and the Philippines at the

end of the 19th century created a dual impact on women, benefiting middle-class women while further exploiting working-class women. This economic disparity meant that middle-class women could leverage their socio-economic advantages to gain political representation, while working-class women remained marginalized. In a patron-client system, where individuals or groups with power and resources provide support and protection to those with less power in exchange for loyalty and service, the lack of resource allocation exacerbates women's underrepresentation. In numerous instances, women have faced challenges winning elections due to their limited involvement in patronage politics. To secure victories, women often need to depend on the predominantly male-dominated network (Iwanaga, 2005). In turn, most of the successful female candidates in Thailand and the Philippines are frequently connected to the patronage system through political relationships established by their own family and their husband's family.

Although the contribution of women from influential families or elite class was in government.

6. Future Prospects

From an Intersectional Feminist perspective, the prospects for women's political participation in Thailand and the Philippines involve challenging and dismantling patriarchal structures to create a more inclusive and equitable political landscape. Here are potential directions based on Intersectional Feminist principles:

Advocacy for Gender-Inclusive Policies

Placing women's issues in the backseat is not beneficial to anyone. There is a need to continuously clamor for women's rights in both Thailand and the Philippines. Intersectional feminism emphasizes the need for affirmative action and gender-inclusive policies. Future efforts should involve advocating for and implementing measures such as quotas or affirmative action to ensure a more balanced representation of women in political positions. These policies can help counteract historical inequalities and provide women with the opportunities needed to participate actively. Based on the fifth Sustainable Development Goal of Gender Equality, the description of its targets includes the end of discrimination against women and the assurance of full participation and equal opportunities for women in leadership (United Nations, n.d.). Gender-inclusive policies create avenues for gender-balanced management and take gender perspectives into regard when it comes to governmental decision-making and processes (Penang Women's Development Corporation, n.d.). However, it should be stated that the policies are to be specifically tailored to women and not take on a "one size fits all" approach. As such, this will ensure that women are being genuinely represented in all political affairs. Citizens in both Thailand and the Philippines can start conversations as to how more women are needed in their governments for their voices to be heard. Whether it is through face-to-face talks or online discussions, people must keep

talking about the issue at hand to keep constant attention to it. As the clamor for proper solutions grows louder and becomes more urgent, those who do have the power to create reforms for the benefit of women have to listen to what the people are saying.

Empowerment through Education and Resources

Future prospects include initiatives to empower women through education and improved access to resources. Investing in women's education, providing training in leadership skills, and ensuring equal access to financial resources can contribute to a more level playing field, allowing women to overcome barriers to political participation. Education should be made even more accessible to all citizens of Thailand and the Philippines, especially for women and children. A report has shown that in the year 2022, literacy rates for adult females were 92.4% in Thailand, which is lower than most other ASEAN countries such as Brunei (96.3%), Singapore (95.9%), Indonesia (94%), Vietnam (93.6%), Malaysia (93.5%) and most notably, the Philippines (98.2%) (The Asian Development Bank, n.d., as cited in Thai PBS World, 2023). In the case of the Philippines, there is no difference between the educational status of men and women but there are discrepancies in urban and rural areas concerning the number of government schools and the peace situation (Hega, 2003). On solutions, Thailand needs to prioritize women in education by making their paths attainable. Affirmative action may be considered to increase the number of women in the educational system, thus increasing their literacy rate. The Philippines, while already having a remarkable literacy rate for women, must increase the number of government schools to further make education obtainable for all. The safety of all students must also be considered to ensure that they are learning peacefully, given that there may be danger zones in certain areas of the country. In addition to making education accessible, schools and universities should also give a premium to women and gender studies. It would help greatly in making students sensitive to gender and knowledgeable in that field. Education is not only an avenue for women to get better jobs, but it is also a powerful tool in giving them the importance that they should have in society.

7. Conclusion

Using the intersectional feminist framework, this paper found that women's political representation in Thailand and the Philippines is influenced by the inter-relationship of gender, socioeconomic status, and other identities while trying to negotiate space for their inclusion in the practice of politics. The intersectional analysis of the enduring influence of patriarchal norms and the marginalization of women from lower classes in both Thailand and the Philippines reveals a common thread of systemic barriers to women's participation in politics. In the Philippines, where local "big men" have historically prevailed over politics and government institutions, the struggle of women in attaining elected government positions arises

from multiple intersecting issues related to social class, gender perceptions, economic barriers, and historical-political dynamics. In predominantly Buddhist Thailand, by contrast, women have faced unique challenges due to the tumultuous history of democratic movements, military coups, and popular uprisings that have occurred in the past three decades. Women are discouraged from entering politics due to the lack of gender sensitivity in political parties, high campaign costs, the necessity of extensive networks, and the harsh public scrutiny of female politicians.

Intersectional feminism emphasizes the importance of addressing diverse needs and perspectives within the female population. Simply increasing the number of women in political office is insufficient if they do not represent the full spectrum of women's experiences. Elite women, though influential, may not adequately represent the interests of marginalized women. Therefore, there is a critical need for structural and institutional changes that empower all women, regardless of socioeconomic status, ethnicity, or other identities. While this study has set its limits on only focusing on the situations in Thailand and the Philippines, it can still serve as a reminder for feminist movements worldwide that the job is not yet done. The intersection of economic inequalities and gender discrimination of women in Thailand and the Philippines creates a "gendered chain" that has been holding women back for years. The gendered chain of discrimination restricts women's ability to exercise their rights and participate as equal members of society. This systemic exclusion reinforces cycles of inequality, where women from marginalized backgrounds struggle to break free from intersecting barriers that impede their advancement and representation. Hence, there is still much work to do to elevate the status of women to be equal to men. Addressing this complex issue requires a multifaceted approach that challenges patriarchal norms, promotes economic empowerment, reforms political institutions, and ensures inclusive policies that uplift all women, regardless of their intersecting identities.

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แนวทางการจัดทำต้นฉบับบทความ

วารสารบัณฑิตพิจารณาณ์ด้านรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์

วารสารบัณฑิตพิจารณาณ์ด้านรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ มีกำหนดออกปีละ 2 ฉบับ ฉบับที่ 1 มกราคม-มิถุนายน และฉบับที่ 2 กรกฎาคม-ธันวาคม มีระบบการพิจารณาณ์การรับบทความตามขั้นตอนการพิจารณาณ์คัดเลือกบทความตามที่ระบุไว้ในเอกสารนี้

1. ประเภทของบทความ และขอบเขตเนื้อหาของบทความที่รับตีพิมพ์

วารสารบัณฑิตพิจารณาณ์ด้านรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ เปิดรับบทความทั้งภาษาไทยและภาษาอังกฤษ ซึ่งมีเนื้อหาเกี่ยวข้องกับด้านสังคมศาสตร์ การเมืองการปกครอง การระหว่างประเทศ รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ การพัฒนา อาณาบริเวณศึกษา และประวัติศาสตร์ การเมือง

- 1) บทความวิจัย
- 2) บทความวิชาการ
- 3) บทความปริทัศน์ (Reviewed articles)
- 4) บทวิจารณ์หนังสือ (Book review)

2. คุณลักษณะของบทความที่รับตีพิมพ์

- 1) บทความที่มีความยาวประมาณ 15-20 หน้า กระดาษ A4 ไม่รวมรูปภาพและตาราง และสำหรับบทความประเภท บทความปริทัศน์ หรือบทวิจารณ์หนังสือ ควรมีความยาวประมาณ 5-10 หน้า กระดาษ A4 (โดยมีระยะขอบของกระดาษ (Margins) ดังนี้ ขอบบนและขอบซ้าย 1.25 นิ้ว ขอบล่างและขอบขวา 1 นิ้ว และระยะห่างระหว่างบรรทัดเท่ากับ 1 (single space))
- 2) จะต้องเป็นบทความที่เขียนขึ้นมาใหม่ (Original article) ไม่เคยตีพิมพ์เผยแพร่ที่ไหนมาก่อน (Redundant publication) หากเป็นบทความที่เคยนำเสนอในที่ประชุมวิชาการ หรืองานสัมมนาวิชาการที่เคยหนึ่งมาก่อน หรือเป็นบทความที่เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของวิทยานิพนธ์ หรือการแปลงานจากภาษาอื่น จะต้องมีการอ้างอิงโดยระบุไว้ในเชิงอรรถ และบทความนั้นจะต้องมีการปรับแก้ให้เป็นไปตามมาตรฐานทางวิชาการ
- 3) ผู้เขียนบทความจะต้องไม่ส่งบทความเพื่อขอรับการพิจารณาณ์ตีพิมพ์มากกว่าหนึ่งวารสารในเวลาเดียวกัน (Simultaneous submission)
- 4) จะต้องไม่เป็นบทความที่ละเมิด หรือคัดลอกผลงานของผู้อื่น (Plagiarism) รวมถึงการคัดลอกผลงานตนเองโดยมิชอบ (self-plagiarism)

- 5) จะต้องเป็นบทความที่มีการจัดรูปแบบ และจัดเตรียมข้อมูลครบถ้วนตามรายละเอียดที่กำหนดในเอกสารฉบับนี้

3. การส่งบทความเพื่อขอรับการพิจารณาลงตีพิมพ์

ขอให้ผู้เขียนนำส่งเอกสาร / ข้อมูล ดังรายการด้านล่าง

- 1) แบบฟอร์มนำส่งบทความ ซึ่งผู้เขียนรับรองว่าบทความที่นำส่งมานั้นเป็นผลงานของผู้เขียนเอง ไม่เคยตีพิมพ์ที่ไหนมาก่อน และไม่อยู่ระหว่างเสนอให้วารสารอื่นพิจารณา จำนวน 1 ฉบับ (ดาวน์โหลดแบบฟอร์มได้ที่ <https://so07.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/GRPSPAJ>)

- 2) ไฟล์ดิจิทัลของ

(1) บทความต้นฉบับที่มีการจัดรูปแบบตามรายละเอียดที่วารสารกำหนด นามสกุล .pdf

(2) บทความต้นฉบับที่มีการจัดรูปแบบตามรายละเอียดที่วารสารกำหนด นามสกุล .doc หรือ .docx และ

(3) รูปภาพ ที่ใช้ประกอบในบทความ นามสกุล .jpg, .jpeg หรือ RAW หรือ TIFF ความละเอียด 300 Pixel / High Resolution ขนาดไฟล์ไม่ต่ำกว่า 500KB

มายังกองบรรณาธิการโดยผ่านทางระบบ TCI-ThaiJO วารสารบัณฑิตศึกษาด้านรัฐศาสตร์ และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ เว็บไซต์ <https://so07.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/GRPSPAJ>

ติดต่อสอบถามข้อมูลเพิ่มเติมได้ที่

กองบรรณาธิการวารสารบัณฑิตศึกษาด้านรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์

คณะรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยเชียงใหม่

239 ถนนห้วยแก้ว ตำบลสุเทพ อำเภอเมือง จังหวัดเชียงใหม่ 50200

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เว็บไซต์: <https://so07.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/GRPSPAJ>

4. การจัดเตรียมต้นฉบับบทความ

4.1 รูปแบบของตัวอักษร

ขอให้ผู้เขียนใช้ตัวอักษรที่มีขนาด ชนิด และการจัดรูปแบบ ดังนี้

รายการ	บทความภาษาไทย (TH Sarabun PSK)			บทความภาษาอังกฤษ (Times New Roman)		
	ขนาด	ชนิด	การจัดเรียง	Size	Type	Alignment
ชื่อเรื่อง / Title	20	หนา	ตรงกลาง	16	Bold	Center
ชื่อผู้เขียน / Author (s)	16	หนา	ชิดขวา	12	Bold	Right Alignment
สังกัดผู้แต่ง / Affiliation (s) (แสดงในรูปแบบ footnote)	14	ธรรมดา	ชิดซ้าย	11	Regular	Justify
หัวข้อบทคัดย่อ / Abstract Title	16	หนา	ตรงกลาง	12	Bold	Center
เนื้อหาบทคัดย่อ / Abstract	16	ธรรมดา	กระจายแบบไทย	12	Regular	Justify
คำสำคัญ / Keywords	16	หนา	ชิดซ้าย	12	Bold	Left Alignment
หัวข้อเรื่อง / Heading	16	หนา	ชิดซ้าย	12	Bold	Left Alignment
หัวข้อย่อย / Sub headings	16	หนา+ เอน	ชิดซ้าย	12	Bold+italic	Left Alignment
เนื้อหา / Content	16	ธรรมดา	กระจายแบบไทย	12	Regular	Justify
ชื่อตารางและชื่อรูปภาพ / Table or Figure title	16	หนา	ชิดซ้าย	12	Bold	Left Alignment
หัวตาราง / Heading row	14	หนา	กลาง	11	Bold	Left Alignment
ข้อความในตาราง หรือภาพ / text in the table or figure	14	ธรรมดา	ชิดซ้ายหรือขวา	11	Regular	Left or Right Alignment
เชิงอรรถ / footnote	14	ธรรมดา	กระจายแบบไทย	11	Regular	Justify
หัวข้อเอกสารอ้างอิง / References Title	16	หนา	กลาง	12	Bold	Left Alignment
เอกสารอ้างอิง / References	16	ธรรมดา	กระจายแบบไทย	12	Regular	Justify

4.2 องค์ประกอบของบทความ

รายการ	คำอธิบาย
ชื่อเรื่อง / Title	ระบุชื่อเรื่องทั้งภาษาไทย และภาษาอังกฤษ ชื่อเรื่องไม่ควรยาวเกินไป และครอบคลุมสาระของบทความ และมีความสอดคล้องกันระหว่างภาษาไทยและภาษาอังกฤษ หมายเหตุ: หากผู้เขียนประสงค์ระบุชื่อแหล่งทุนได้ให้การสนับสนุนการทำวิจัย สามารถระบุได้โดยการเพิ่มเชิงอรรถไว้ที่ท้ายชื่อเรื่อง
ชื่อผู้เขียน / Author (s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ ระบุชื่อผู้แต่งทั้งภาษาไทยและภาษาอังกฤษ ■ ไม่ควรระบุตำแหน่งทางวิชาการ ยศ ตำแหน่งทางทหาร คำนำหน้าชื่อ รวมทั้งสถานภาพ (เช่น นักศึกษาปริญญาเอก, อาจารย์ที่ปรึกษา) ทั้งที่ด้านหน้า และท้ายชื่อผู้แต่ง
สังกัดผู้แต่ง / Affiliation (s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ ระบุข้อมูลสถานะ หรือตำแหน่งทางวิชาการ และชื่อหน่วยงานที่ผู้แต่งสังกัด <u>ในเชิงอรรถ</u> โดยเรียงจากหน่วยงานระดับต้นไปจนถึงหน่วยงานหลัก แล้วจึงระบุจังหวัด รหัสไปรษณีย์ ประเทศ และอีเมล (ขอให้ระบุอีเมลอย่างน้อยสำหรับผู้แต่งหลัก (Corresponding author)) ■ หากหน่วยงานที่ผู้แต่งสังกัดเป็นภาษาไทย ให้ระบุรายละเอียดหน่วยงานที่ผู้แต่งสังกัดเป็นภาษาอังกฤษ ในบรรทัดถัดจากชื่อหน่วยงานที่สังกัดภาษาไทย
บทคัดย่อ / Abstract	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ บทคัดย่อภาษาไทย ควรมีเพียง 1 ย่อหน้า ความยาวไม่เกิน 300 คำ ■ บทคัดย่อภาษาอังกฤษ ควรมีเพียง 1 ย่อหน้า ความยาวไม่เกิน 300 คำ และมีเนื้อหาสอดคล้องกับบทคัดย่อภาษาไทย โดยเนื้อหาในบทคัดย่อควรประกอบไปด้วย <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) ความสำคัญของการศึกษา (main argument or thesis statement) (2) วัตถุประสงค์ (research purpose) (3) ระเบียบวิธีวิจัย/วิธีการศึกษา (research methodology) หรือกรอบแนวคิด (conceptual framework) (4) ผลการวิจัยหรือผลการศึกษา (research finding) หรือข้อค้นพบที่สำคัญ (main finding) หรือข้อเสนอแนะเชิงนโยบาย (5) สรุปและประโยชน์ที่ได้จากการศึกษา (conclusion and contribution)
คำสำคัญ / Keywords	ระบุคำสำคัญจำนวนไม่เกิน 5 คำ โดยคำสำคัญแต่ละคำ ให้แสดงทั้งภาษาไทยและภาษาอังกฤษซึ่งมีความหมายตรงกัน
เนื้อหา / Content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ ควรประกอบด้วยส่วนของความนำ เนื้อหา และบทสรุป ■ การใช้คำศัพท์เฉพาะทางวิชาการ <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) กรณีคำภาษาอังกฤษที่มีการใช้ทับศัพท์ภาษาไทยอย่างแพร่หลาย ให้เขียนเป็นภาษาไทยตามที่มีการบัญญัติศัพท์ในพจนานุกรมฉบับราชบัณฑิตยสถาน โดยไม่ต้องแสดงคำศัพท์ภาษาอังกฤษประกอบ อาทิ อินเทอร์เน็ต อิเล็กทรอนิกส์ (2) กรณีคำภาษาอังกฤษที่ยังไม่มีการใช้แพร่หลาย ให้เขียนคำแปลภาษาไทย หรือคำทับศัพท์ โดยแสดงคำศัพท์ภาษาอังกฤษ และอักษรย่อ (ถ้ามี) ประกอบในวงเล็บ ทั้งนี้ การเขียนคำศัพท์ภาษาอังกฤษในวงเล็บ ให้ใช้ตัวพิมพ์เล็กทั้งหมด

รายการ	คำอธิบาย
	<p>ยกเว้นคำที่มีอักษรย่อหรือคำเฉพาะ ซึ่งจะขึ้นต้นคำด้วยตัวพิมพ์ใหญ่ และควรเขียนคำภาษาอังกฤษกำกับครั้งแรกเพียงครั้งเดียวครั้งต่อไปไม่จำเป็นต้องเขียนภาษาอังกฤษกำกับอีก เช่น องค์การสหประชาชาติ (United Nations: UN)</p> <p>(3) กรณีที่คำทั้งภาษาไทยและภาษาอังกฤษที่มีการใช้อักษรย่อ ให้ระบุคำเต็มและอักษรย่อในครั้งแรกที่มีการกล่าวถึง และครั้งต่อไปให้ใช้อักษรย่อเพียงอย่างเดียว อาทิ องค์การปกครองส่วนท้องถิ่น (อปท.) ครั้งต่อไปใช้ อปท., องค์การสหประชาชาติ (United Nations: UN) ครั้งต่อไปใช้ UN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ การแสดงตาราง รูปภาพ หรือแผนภาพ <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) ให้แสดงชื่อตาราง รูปภาพ หรือแผนภาพ ด้านบนตาราง รูปภาพ หรือแผนภาพ และใส่หมายเลขกำกับตาราง รูปภาพ หรือแผนภาพ โดยเรียงตามลำดับการนำเสนอในเรื่อง (2) หากเป็นตาราง รูปภาพ หรือแผนภาพที่อ้างอิงมาจากแหล่งข้อมูลอื่นให้อ้างอิงที่มาโดยแสดงที่มาไว้ใต้ตาราง รูปภาพ หรือแผนภาพ (ใช้รูปแบบการอ้างอิงแบบนามปี) และดำเนินการให้เป็นไปตามข้อกำหนดเกี่ยวกับลิขสิทธิ์ (3) หากมีหมายเหตุประกอบตาราง รูปภาพ หรือแผนภาพ ให้ใส่หมายเหตุไว้บรรทัดใต้ที่มา ■ เชิงบรรณ (footnote) ในเนื้อหา ใช้สำหรับการอธิบายขยายความจากในเนื้อหาเท่านั้น ไม่ใช้สำหรับการอ้างอิงเอกสารในเรื่อง (การอ้างอิงเอกสารในเรื่องใช้รูปแบบการอ้างอิงในเนื้อหา (In-text citation))
การอ้างอิงเอกสารในเนื้อหา / In-text citation	ใช้รูปแบบการอ้างอิงถึงในเนื้อหา (In-text citation) แบบนามปี (Name-and-year system) ในระบบ American Psychological Association 7 th edition (APA7) (ดูรายละเอียดในหัวข้อ การอ้างอิงถึงในเนื้อหาและการลงรายการเอกสารอ้างอิง)
เอกสารอ้างอิง / References	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ ให้แสดงรายการเอกสารอ้างอิงตอนท้ายของบทความ โดยใช้รูปแบบเอกสารอ้างอิงในระบบ APA โดยผู้เขียนต้องตรวจสอบข้อมูลการอ้างอิงให้ครบถ้วนสมบูรณ์ รวมทั้งรายการเอกสารอ้างอิงจะต้องครอบคลุมรายการที่มีการอ้างอิงในเนื้อหา ■ ให้แสดงรายการเอกสารอ้างอิงโดยเรียงลำดับตามตัวอักษร และให้เรียงรายการเอกสารอ้างอิงที่เป็นสิ่งพิมพ์ภาษาไทยก่อน แล้วจึงตามด้วยรายการเอกสารอ้างอิงที่เป็นสิ่งพิมพ์ภาษาต่างประเทศ ■ คณะรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยเชียงใหม่ ไม่รับผิดชอบต่อเนื้อหาที่นำมาจากเว็บไซต์ภายนอกที่ถูกอ้างอิงในบทความในวารสาร ความถูกต้องของ URL ที่ถูกอ้างนั้นสามารถสืบค้นได้เมื่อวันที่ผู้เขียนเขียนบทความ

4.3 การอ้างอิงในเนื้อหา และการลงรายการบรรณานุกรม

4.3.1 การอ้างอิงในเนื้อหาแบบนามปี ในระบบ APA 7th

- (1) การอ้างอิงในเนื้อหาแบบนามปี ในระบบ APA สามารถทำได้ ดังนี้
 - อ้างอิงโดยชื่อผู้แต่งอยู่ในเนื้อความ เช่น เก่ง เขียนดี (2559, น. 1) ได้ให้ข้อเสนอแนะเกี่ยวกับ..., Smith (2016) defines public policy as...,
 - อ้างอิงโดยลงรายการชื่อผู้แต่ง, ปี, เลขหน้าในเครื่องหมายวงเล็บ เช่น (เก่ง เขียนดี, 2559, น. 1), (Smith, 2016, p. 1)
- (2) กรณีผู้แต่ง 1 คน ผู้แต่งที่เป็นชาวไทยให้ใส่ทั้งชื่อ และนามสกุล หากผู้แต่งเป็นชาวต่างประเทศ ให้ใส่เฉพาะนามสกุล อาทิ (เก่ง เขียนดี, 2559, น. 1), (Smith, 2016, p. 1)
- (3) กรณีผู้แต่ง 2 คน ให้ลงรายการด้วยชื่อผู้แต่งทั้งสองคนทุกครั้งที่ย่อ โดยผู้แต่งชาวไทยให้คั่นระหว่างชื่อด้วยคำว่า “และ” เช่น (เก่ง เขียนดี และชยัน อุดทน, 2559) และผู้แต่งชาวต่างประเทศ ให้คั่นระหว่างชื่อด้วย “and” เช่น Smith and Adam (2016) แต่ถ้าชื่อผู้แต่งอยู่ในวงเล็บ ใส่เครื่องหมาย “&” แทนคำว่า “and” เช่น (Smith & Adam, 2016)
- (4) กรณีผู้แต่ง 3 คนขึ้นไป ให้ลงเฉพาะชื่อคนแรก และตามด้วยคำว่า “และคณะ” สำหรับผู้แต่งภาษาไทย และ “et al.” สำหรับผู้แต่งชาวต่างชาติ เช่น (เก่ง เขียนดี และคณะ, 2559, น. 3) หรือ (Smith et al., 2016, p. 102)
- (5) สิ่งพิมพ์คนละรายการ พิมพ์คนละปี แต่มีผู้แต่งคนเดียวกัน หรือกลุ่มเดียวกัน และผู้เขียนต้องการอ้างอิงพร้อมๆ กัน ให้ลงรายการด้วยชื่อผู้แต่ง ตามด้วยปีที่พิมพ์ โดยเรียงลำดับปีที่พิมพ์จากเก่าไปใหม่ และคั่นระหว่างปีด้วยเครื่องหมาย “,” เช่น (เก่ง เขียนดี, 2555, 2559), (Smith, 2014, 2016)
- (6) สิ่งพิมพ์คนละรายการ พิมพ์ปีเดียวกัน แต่มีผู้แต่งคนเดียวกัน หรือกลุ่มเดียวกัน และผู้เขียนต้องการอ้างอิงพร้อมๆ กัน ให้ลงรายการด้วยชื่อผู้แต่ง ตามด้วยปีที่พิมพ์ โดยลงอักษร ก, ข, ค กำกับหลังปีที่พิมพ์สำหรับผู้แต่งคนไทย และ a, b, c สำหรับผู้แต่งชาวต่างประเทศ และคั่นระหว่างปีด้วยเครื่องหมาย “,” เช่น (เก่ง เขียนดี, 2555ก, 2555ข), (Smith, 2014a, 2014b)
- (7) การอ้างอิงสิ่งพิมพ์หลายรายการ ผู้แต่งต่างกัน พร้อมกัน ให้คั่นแต่ละรายการด้วยเครื่องหมาย “;” เรียงลำดับตามตัวอักษรชื่อ (หรือนามสกุล) ผู้แต่ง เช่น (เก่ง เขียนดี, 2559; มานะ พยายาม, 2558), (Adam, 2014; Smith & Potter, 2016)
- (8) กรณีผู้แต่งที่เป็นหน่วยงานหรือสถาบัน ให้ลงรายการครั้งแรกด้วยชื่อเต็มของหน่วยงาน/สถาบัน และตามด้วยชื่อย่อในวงเล็บ “[...]” และการอ้างอิงครั้งต่อไปใช้แต่ชื่อย่อ ยกเว้นการ

- อ้างชื่อมหาวิทยาลัยให้ใส่ชื่อเต็มทุกครั้ง เช่น ครั้งแรก (สำนักงานกองทุนสนับสนุนการสร้างเสริมสุขภาพ [สสส.], 2558) ครั้งถัดไป (สสส., 2558)
- (9) กรณีที่เป็นเอกสารไม่ปรากฏชื่อผู้แต่ง ให้แสดงรายการโดยระบุชื่อสิ่งพิมพ์นั้นแทนชื่อผู้แต่ง โดย หากเป็นสิ่งพิมพ์ประเภทบทความ ให้ใส่ชื่อบทความ ในเครื่องหมายอัญประกาศ เช่น (“นโยบายสาธารณะ”, 2559) หากเป็นสิ่งพิมพ์ประเภทหนังสือให้ใส่ชื่อหนังสือโดยใช้ตัวเอน เช่น (*มาตรฐานการเผยแพร่ผลงานวิจัยและผลงานทางวิชาการ*, 2555)
- (10) กรณีการอ้างถึงสิ่งพิมพ์ที่ปรากฏในเอกสารอื่น ให้ลงรายการโดยภาษาไทยใช้คำว่า “อ้างถึงใน” และภาษาต่างประเทศใช้ “as cited in” เช่น (เก่ง เขียนดี, 2555 อ้างถึงใน มานะ พยายาม, 2559), (Smith, 2015 as cited in Adam, 2016) ในกรณีนี้ให้ผู้เขียนแสดงรายการเอกสารอ้างอิงท้ายบทความเฉพาะรายการที่ตนเองอ่านมาโดยตรง เช่น จากตัวอย่างรายการเอกสารอ้างอิงท้ายบทความจะมีเฉพาะรายการของ “มานะ พยายาม, 2559” เท่านั้น ไม่ต้องแสดงรายการของ “เก่ง เขียนดี, 2555”
- (11) การอ้างถึงข้อมูลจากการสัมภาษณ์ การติดต่อทางโทรศัพท์ หรือทางช่องทางอิเล็กทรอนิกส์ เช่น อีเมล เว็บบอร์ด ให้ใส่ตำแหน่งงานหรือสถานะของผู้ให้ข้อมูลหรือกลุ่มผู้ให้ข้อมูลตามที่น่าเสนอไว้ในการศึกษาวิจัย เช่น ประชาชน/ข้าราชการตามด้วยคำว่า “การสื่อสารส่วนบุคคล” สำหรับชาวไทย และ “personal communication” สำหรับชาวต่างประเทศ เช่น (ผู้บริหารคณะรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยเชียงใหม่, การสื่อสารส่วนบุคคล, 20 กันยายน 2559), (1st student, personal communication, September 20, 2016) ทั้งนี้ หากผู้เขียนต้องการอ้างอิงชื่อผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ข้อมูลโดยเปิดเผยชื่อผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ ผู้เขียนจะต้องได้รับการอนุญาตจากผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์เป็นลายลักษณ์อักษรเท่านั้น

4.3.2 การลงรายการบรรณานุกรม ในระบบ APA 7th

- รายการเอกสารที่ปรากฏในเอกสารอ้างอิง (Reference) ท้ายบทความ จะต้องเป็นรายการเอกสารที่มีการอ้างถึงในเนื้อหาบทความ (In-text citation) เท่านั้น
- การลงรายการบรรณานุกรมสำหรับสิ่งพิมพ์แต่ละประเภท มีรายละเอียดดังนี้

ประเภทสิ่งพิมพ์	รูปแบบการลงรายการเอกสารอ้างอิง
หนังสือ/ตำรา (Book)	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปีที่พิมพ์)/ ชื่อเรื่อง./ ชื่อสำนักพิมพ์.
บทความในหนังสือรวมบทความ (Chapter in book)	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปีที่พิมพ์)/ ชื่อบทความ./ ใน/ ชื่อบรรณาธิการ./ (บก.)./ ชื่อหนังสือ/ (น./ เลขหน้า-เลขหน้า)/ ชื่อสำนักพิมพ์. Author(s)/ (year of publication)/ Article title./ In/ Editor/ (Ed. ถ้ามีหลายคนใช้ Eds)/ Book title/ (p. ถ้ามีหลายหน้าใช้ pp./ page number- page number)/ Publisher.
บทความในวารสาร (Journal Article)	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปีที่พิมพ์)/ ชื่อบทความ./ ชื่อวารสาร./ ปีที่/ (ฉบับที่)/ เลขหน้าที่ปรากฏบทความ-เลขหน้า. URL หรือ DOI Author(s)/ (year of publication) . / Article title. / Journal, / Vol/ (No), / page number-page number. URL or DOI.
รายงานการวิจัย (Research Report)	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปีที่พิมพ์)/ ชื่อเรื่อง./ (รายงานการวิจัย)/ ชื่อสำนักพิมพ์. Author(s)/ (year of publication)/ title/ (Research report)/ Publisher.
เอกสารการประชุมทางวิชาการ (Proceedings, Symposium)	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปีที่พิมพ์)/ ชื่อบทความ./ ชื่อการประชุมหรือการสัมมนา./ สถานที่จัดการประชุม. Author(s)/ (year of publication)/ Article title./ [Conference Session]/ Title of Conference./ Location.
ผลงานนำเสนอในงานประชุมวิชาการ (Paper Presentation)	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปีที่น่าเสนอ./ เดือนที่น่าเสนอ/วัน)/ ชื่อผลงาน/[เอกสารนำเสนอในที่ประชุม]/ ชื่อการประชุมหรือการสัมมนา./ สถานที่จัดการประชุม. Author(s)/ (year of publication, /month/day)./ title/[Paper Presentation]/ Title of Conference./ Location.
หนังสือแปล (Translated Book)	ชื่อผู้แต่งหนังสือต้นฉบับที่แปลเป็นภาษาไทยแล้ว./ (ปีที่พิมพ์หนังสือแปล)/ ชื่อหนังสือที่แปลแล้ว./ (ชื่อหนังสือต้นฉบับ./ ชื่อผู้แปล./ ผู้แปล)/ ใน/ หนังสือแปล./ (หน้า/ เลขหน้า-เลขหน้า)/ สำนักพิมพ์./ (ต้นฉบับพิมพ์/ปี/ค.ศ. หรือ พ.ศ. ที่พิมพ์ต้นฉบับ). Author(s)/ (year of publication) . / Article title./ (Editor, /Trans.)/ In/ Editor/ (Ed. or Eds) , / Book title/ (pp. / page number- page number) . / Publisher./ (Original Work Publishd/Year).
วิทยานิพนธ์ และ ปรียญานิพนธ์ (Thesis)	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปีที่พิมพ์)/ ชื่อวิทยานิพนธ์หรือปรียญานิพนธ์./ [วิทยานิพนธ์ชื่อปรียญ, ชื่อสถาบันการศึกษา]/ ชื่อฐานข้อมูล หรือ ชื่อแหล่งเก็บผลงาน. URL Author./ (year of published) ./ Doctoral dissertation or Master's thesis Title. / [Doctoral dissertation or Master's thesis, Name of Institute Awarding the Degree]/ Database Name or Archive Name.

ประเภทสิ่งพิมพ์	รูปแบบการลงรายการเอกสารอ้างอิง
บทความจากหนังสือพิมพ์ (Newspaper)	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปีที่พิมพ์./เดือน/วัน)./ชื่อบทความ./ชื่อหนังสือพิมพ์./URL Author./ (year of published, / month/ day) . / Article title. / Newspaper Title./URL
เอกสารอิเล็กทรอนิกส์หรือเอกสารจากฐานข้อมูล (Databases)	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปี./เดือน/วัน)./ชื่อเอกสาร./ชื่อเว็บไซต์./URL Author./ (year of published, /month/ day) . /Title./Website Name./URL or name of database
ข้อมูล/เอกสารจาก Facebook	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปี./เดือน/วัน)./ชื่อเรื่อง/[Facebook status update]./สืบค้นเมื่อ/วันที่/เดือน/ปี./จาก/URL Author./ (year of published, /month/day) . /Title. / [Facebook status update] . / Retrieved /mm/dd, /year, /from/URL
ข้อมูล/เอกสารจาก Twitter	ชื่อผู้แต่ง./ (ปี./เดือน/วัน)./ชื่อเรื่อง/[Tweet]./สืบค้นเมื่อ/วัน/เดือน/ปี./จาก/URL Author./ (year of published, /month/ day) . /Title. / [Tweet] . / Retrieved /mm/dd, /year, /from/URL

- การระบุชื่อผู้แต่ง มีรายละเอียดดังนี้
 - (1) ผู้แต่งชาวไทย ลงรายการด้วยชื่อ แล้วตามด้วยนามสกุล และผู้แต่งชาวต่างประเทศ ลงรายการด้วยนามสกุล ตามด้วยชื่อแรกและชื่อกลางซึ่งใช้อักษรย่อ
 - (2) ผู้แต่ง 2 คน ให้ลงชื่อผู้แต่งทุกคน โดยใช้คำว่า “, และ” (สำหรับคนไทย) และ “, &” (สำหรับชาวต่างประเทศ) คั่นระหว่างชื่อ
 - (3) ผู้แต่ง 3-20 คน ให้ลงชื่อผู้แต่งทุกคน คั่นระหว่างชื่อด้วยเครื่องหมาย “,” และคั่นก่อนชื่อคนสุดท้ายด้วย “, และ” ในภาษาไทย และ “, &” ในภาษาอังกฤษ
 - (4) สิ่งพิมพ์ที่ไม่ปรากฏชื่อผู้แต่ง ให้ใส่ชื่อสิ่งพิมพ์ (หนังสือ หรือวารสาร) ด้วยตัวเอนแทน และตามด้วยปีที่พิมพ์ เช่น *ชื่อหนังสือ*./ (ปีที่พิมพ์) ./สำนักพิมพ์.

■ คำย่อสำหรับการลงรายการเอกสารอ้างอิง

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■ สิ่งพิมพ์ที่อยู่ระหว่างรอพิมพ์ ให้ใช้ข้อความ “(อยู่ระหว่างรอพิมพ์)” สำหรับภาษาไทย และ “(in press)” สำหรับภาษาอังกฤษ

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จากการทบทวนงานวิจัย (Author, forthcoming) พบว่า.....

(2) การอ้างอิงในรายการเอกสารอ้างอิง (References)

ชื่อผู้แต่ง. (อยู่ระหว่างรอพิมพ์). ชื่อบทความ. *ชื่อวารสาร*.

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**กองบรรณาธิการวารสารบัณฑิตพิจารณาณ์ด้านรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์
คณะรัฐศาสตร์และรัฐประศาสนศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยเชียงใหม่**

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