

Research Article

Special Autonomy as a One Conflict Solution for Aceh Peacebuilding¹

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Abstract

This article examines the initiatives taken by the governments of Aceh and Indonesia to create a Special Autonomy following the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding in August 2005. Systematic examinations of pertinent books, articles, interviews, and documents pertaining to the Government of Indonesia's (GOI) policy throughout the past fifteen years. The Indonesian legal system, as outlined in Act No. 11 of 2006 on the Governance of Aceh, governs special autonomy in Aceh as one of its peacebuilding initiatives. The political sector in Aceh's local government makes sure that the chance to conduct local elections in a separate stream has been properly utilized. Seven of the 19 candidates in the three gubernatorial elections ran as independents. After the Helsinki MoU, Aceh now has its own political structure, but for peace to persist, the administration needs to be improved.

Keywords: Peacebuilding, Special Autonomy, Aceh Peacebuilding

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Introduction

Conflict in Aceh is mostly a result of the Government of Indonesia's (GOI) policies with centralist, unfair, and underdeveloped provincial economies. The people of Aceh have supported the liberation struggle in their quest for better lives, independence, and peace.

Tengku Muhammad Hasan Tiro founded the Aceh Free Movement, also known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), in 1976. The GOI responded to the widespread arrests and murders of GAM members following their proclamation of independence (Kingsbury, Fernandez, 2008). The expectations of the Acehnese people for the return of Islam as the dominant sociopolitical force in Aceh were not met by the GOI (Miller, 2003).

After 1998, GOI tried to use diplomacy to end the issues. Indonesia has adopted a new strategy for Aceh with the Transcend Approach and established a forum for the public to examine the conflict and its underlying causes. In addition, GOI inspired fresh methods for settling the conflict amicably. A disaster triggered by an earthquake and tsunami in December 2004 destroyed Aceh and killed hundreds of thousands of people. The resumption of negotiations between GAM and GOI was supported by this crisis (Kadir, 2012).

The negotiations for peace took place in Helsinki, Finland. Marti Ahtisaari was successful in persuading people to view the Aceh conflict as an asymmetrical battle (Djuli, Rahman, 2008). Ahtisaari suggested a special autonomy as a resolution to the parties in conflict (Awaludin, 2008). After five rounds of negotiations, GAM and GOI signed a Memorandum of Understanding, marking a very

significant step forward towards peacebuilding (Helsinki MoU, 2005). The Republic of Indonesia's Constitution and regulations allowed for the establishment of an Aceh government through a fair and democratic procedure, creating a new situation in Aceh. The parties are optimized to establish a comprehensive and long-lasting solution because of the conversations that have taken place.

One suggestion between the GOI and GAM is Special Autonomy, which would provide separatist parties more chances to get experience working with governments, hone local identities, and set up infrastructure for the desired independent state. The governments must issue directives and restrict any extra-systemic violence as one approach to reducing violence related to movements for autonomy or independence (Mietzer, 2007). Regulation of ties between the state and the people as well as relationships between the various levels of government are both concerns of special autonomy (Maskun, 1999).

The Helsinki Peace Agreement obliged GAM to dismantle itself, and as a result, the former GAM rebels transformed their separatist organization into a democratic movement known as the Aceh Party. This presented GAM with its greatest hurdle following the Helsinki MoU. However, the previous rebels or organizations believed that peace would be too expensive if they were to be exterminated from the new administration. In other words, the implementation of the post-conflict local election will face one of the most difficult challenges if the former combatant group is destroyed (Brancati & Snyder 2011).

Access to political and economic resources is crucial for establishing stability and promoting peace in Aceh. The GOI adhered

to its commitments to provide amnesties to rebels who had been imprisoned and establish regional autonomy agreements. The peace process in Aceh contributed to a rapid improvement in the socioeconomic and security situation in the province. After the restoration effort, numerous jobs in politics and economic administration were made available to the old GAM elites (Aspinall, 2008).

Interplaying political, economic, and access considerations are significant contributors to establishing peace and maintaining stability in Aceh. Aceh Party (PA) actors' cadres are now in positions of authority across Aceh, including the governor's office and the city's legislative and executive branches. Many actors former GAM's group's victory through the Aceh Party (PA). The condition has provided wider economic access and opportunities for former GAM combatants (Jarstad, 1998). Several former GAM have occupied key strategic political and social posts and secured numerous procurement contracts throughout the Province's post-conflict reconstruction process through the new political party, the Aceh Party.

The new emerging circle of power and the social structure in the province have risen to new social structures and have emerged new potential conflicts in the Aceh people. One of the important things for sustainable peace is good governance. It becomes the indicator for the success or failure of democracy development and peacebuilding in any post-conflict region. Various dimensions of governance, such as accountability, transparency, public services, and law enforcement are important to maintain sustainable peace (Korth, 2011).

After the Helsinki MoU and the Law of Governing Aceh (LoGA), the people of Aceh maintain their own autonomy. They currently serve as Aceh's administrators, government representatives, business owners, and members of civil society. They have controlled several political roles, particularly for the erstwhile GAM elites. In addition, the task of maintaining the peace and rebuilding Aceh now falls to Aceh's new generation of provincial and district politicians. Until now, their performance has been lackluster, as they embark on a steep learning curve while navigating the new political landscape (Aspinall, 2011).

This research will focus on the parties involved in dealing with the political and economic development of Aceh and how autonomy would work in a peaceful situation. Moreover, it is important for this research to examine special autonomy as of conflict solution for Aceh peacebuilding.

Objective

To examine the implementation of the peacebuilding situation in Aceh after the MoU-Helsinki.

Research Question

What were the local government and the GOI's strategic policies to ensure peacebuilding and development in Aceh after the Helsinki MoU?

Literature Review

The Aceh conflict is related to the region's historical location in the Malaka Strait, its significance as a crossroads for trade, and its previous status as an independent sultanate. Aceh's people also have a strong legacy of Islamic social structure and strong leadership, including queens who fiercely resisted invasion. When Indonesia initially gained its independence, the people of Aceh provided the newly established Government of Indonesia with enormous financial and material support, one of which was by giving their own gold for the country's first national aircraft (Aguswandi, 2008).

Local elites and influential Islamic scholars in Aceh supported an armed insurrection led by Daud Beureuh from 1953 until the beginning of 1960 when the Jakarta regime had a centralizing strategy development. (Suadi, 2016). In reaction to the revolt, President Soekarno from GOI established a policy to reinstate Aceh's provincial status and its autonomy in religious and cultural areas in 1956. When the regime changed five years later, the promise of autonomy was once more breached. The new President's centralist practices and policies on the exploitation of natural resources, the disparity in development between Java and the surrounding areas including Aceh, and the revenue leak to Jakarta's elites were all features of his administration.

Local elites in Aceh response centralistic development with establish GAM or Free Aceh Movement in 1976. After the declaration and movement of GAM, GOI treated GAM as an insurgent. The movement appeared to have been crushed after a military treatment from GOI with most GAM leaders in prison, exile, or dead

(Robinson, 2001). In 1989, the GOI swiftly responded to this new threat by designating Aceh as a Military Operation Area. The revolt was put an end after two years, and most GAM's top commanders and leaders were either killed or arrested (Martinkus, 2001).

The GOI was in disarray because of the economic crisis in the late 1990s. In all of Indonesia, unrest flares up and spills onto the streets. As the military suppresses protests, many people die, and large numbers are detained. Massive pressure from civil society organizations in Indonesia's major cities began for government to step down. In 1998, Habibie as new President, initiated a new program of decentralization to give the regions of Indonesia to have more political and financial autonomy with transition from a dictatorship to a democracy.

Demobilization of paramilitary organizations and other security arrangements to refugee resettlement, economic reconstruction, and the advancement of human rights are among the many peacebuilding initiatives (Jeong, 2005). To achieve lasting peace, political institutions must be strengthened, internal and external security must be consolidated, and the economy and security must be revived (Bell, 2001).

Special autonomy policies provide local organizations more chances to work in government, develop their local identities, and set up the necessary infrastructure for the desired independent state. Since it is ultimately the people's right to run their own form of government in a way that would meet their own laws, ethics, and local customs, special autonomy is essentially the responsibility of the local population.

Governments need to provide directives and limit any extra-systemic violence as one approach to reduce violence related to movements for autonomy or independence (Mietzer, 2007). Regulation of ties between the state and the people as well as relationships between the various levels of government are both concerns of special autonomy (Maskun, 1999). One of the components of transitional justice is the advancement of peace. Transitional justice is a strategy for dealing with persistent or widespread human rights abuses that offers victims compensation while also creating or enhancing prospects for the transformation of political structures, conflicts, and other factors that may have contributed to the abuses. The notion is that these circumstances aid in preventing the widespread or systemic violation of human rights. Dealing with systematic or widespread human rights violations is one of the most challenging and politically sensitive problems in transitional justice (United Nation, 2008).

The transcend method is a novel perspective on conflict transformation and peacebuilding that offers alternatives to more recent or current ways that have been shown to be ineffective. Instead, of seeing opposing parties (people, countries, etc.) or one or more parties to be controlled, the main strategy is to see conflict as an incompatible approach or an issue that needs to be solved (usually not oneself) (Galtung, 2000).

Research Framework




Figure 1: Research Framework

Methods

The research will concentrate on how the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding has been applied to politics and democracy in Aceh. The focus of this study is on the post-conflict municipal government's growth under a specific degree of autonomy. This research is concerned with peacebuilding as a means of bringing about social change through the restoration of the political, social, and economic spheres. Given that it is linked to various ideologies, the term of peacebuilding can denote a wide range of definitions and ideas. They may include issues like organized crime and insecurity, human rights violations, racial and religious tensions, national instability, poverty, economic development, and governmental authority. These issues in Aceh peacebuilding will undoubtedly vary based on the setting and ideology. Sustainable peace is the integrated foundation for the idea

of peacebuilding, therefore if peace is to be established, local people must take over as the "principal authors of peacebuilding" (Paffenholz 2015, 859).

Newspaper articles, journal papers, report studies, and other internet sources were used to gather data and real facts about certain occurrences in Aceh. Secondary sources that have attempted to explain peacebuilding in Aceh were used as observation sources.

Result

The Strategic Policy to Ensure Peacebuilding and Development

The Aceh conflict, which is largely a battle between GAM and GOI over control of Aceh under a totalitarian and centralized state, is one of the sub-national dimension conflicts. The GOI's response to governmental injustice, political and economic centralization, and the threatened identity of the Aceh people were characteristics of the Aceh conflict. The early 2000 regime transition provided momentum for the establishment of peace between Aceh and the GOI. The Helsinki MoU as the peacemaking refers to a negotiating process that took place between the decision-makers with the goal of arriving at an official settlement or resolution. This was made possible through an MoU signed in Helsinki by the GOI and GAM with CMI acting as the mediator. After many years, the beginning of the negotiation employed a transcending method to end the war in Aceh. Self-determination was starting to dominate GAM's discussions as it became clear that the GOI had no choice but to grant Aceh independence. GAM demanded that the GOI pay

attention to it in terms of wealth, unique autonomy, and a long history of pledges with places that practice sharia Islam. (Liza, 2021).

Political growth in Aceh is based on the people's aspirations as well as Islamic and customary law. Since many years ago, Aceh has had sharia in place in four areas: Islamic Law, cultures and traditions, education, and the function of ulama (Islamic scholars) in the administration (Manan, 2020). Additionally, sharia is a collection of guidelines that govern social, moral, religious, and legal direction in Aceh society. Aceh is distinct from all other Indonesian provinces due to its own system of governance and institutions supporting autonomy. The table below displays information about the institutions in Aceh.

Table 1: Aceh Special Autonomy Institution

No	Institution	Functions
1	<i>Wali Nanggro</i> e	Indigenous leadership institution
2	<i>Mahkamah Syariah</i>	Sharia Court
3	<i>Wilayat</i> ul Hisbah	Aceh Sharia Police
4	Ulama Consultative Assembly	Islamic Consultation for local government
5	Aceh Indigenous Assembly	Indigenous Aceh institution
6	<i>Gampong</i>	Indigenous Community
7	Aceh's Independent Commission	Election Commission of Aceh with authorize independent candidate and local party
8	Aceh's House of Representatives	Parliament with Islamic Law (Qanun) product

One of the efforts to address identity-related deprivation in Aceh is through granting “cultural protection”. It is translated into the establishment of the Wali Nanggroe institution as “an indigenous leadership institution used as the uniting instrument of the community and the preserving instrument of indigenous life, customs, and culture” (Law of Governing Aceh, 2006, article 1.17).

The three entities that make up the sharia system in Aceh are the Mahkamah Syariah (Sharia Court), the Wilayatul Hisbah (Sharia Police), and the Dinas Syariah (Sharia Bureau) (Aspinall, 2007). At the province and district levels, the Dinas Syariah is the main organization in charge of overseeing and coordinating the application of Sharia (Aspinall, 2007a). The Wilayatul Hisbah is a special police force whose responsibility is to keep an eye on how well Islamic law is being followed, specifically to make sure that the sharia regulations are upheld (Aspinall, 2007).

GOI Policies in Aceh After the Helsinki MoU

Aceh has a long history of the GOI promises for Islamic or sharia institutions. The local government is the primary actor in the development of their institutional and political structures, which are rooted on Aceh's and Islam's views. The GOI has kept a distance from any internal problems or actors in Aceh. Therefore, in the era of peacebuilding, the roles of local actors and governments are crucial for Aceh.

The political sector in Aceh's local government makes sure that the opportunity to run in the local elections as an independent candidate has been effectively utilized. From three gubernatorial elections, seven out of 19 candidates ran as independent candidates, even though only Irwandi and Muhammad Nazar won

the race successfully. At the district level, only one independent candidate, Tengku Nurdin-Tengku Busmadar, won the local election in Bireun.

Three of Aceh's gubernatorial elections included strong representation from these four groups. The first group consisted of GAM-affiliated candidates who were largely running as independents. Representatives from civil society organizations, most notably from Aceh Referendum Information Center, which was funded through party tickets or other independent streams, made up the second group. The third group was made up of rich contractors or businessmen. Legislators, military commanders, bureaucrats, including incumbents, and party leaders make up the final category of technocrats. Instead of running as independent candidates, this group received nominations from major parties (Clark and Palmer, 2008).

The Independent Election Committee was established to manage local elections in Aceh with special autonomy. The IEC was a different entity from the national election. The IEC had more independent members without assistance from the central election commission, but they were still having problems with institutional and individual performance. The IEC Commissioners were chosen by the Provincial Assembly, which the people of Aceh elected to represent them.

The 2006 elections for the governor and district heads were a political turning point in Aceh. The most crucial topic was whether or not independent and local political parties would be permitted to run in provincial elections, as required under the Memorandum of Understanding. GAM vowed to boycott the elections if

independent candidates were not permitted to compete. Following heated debate and numerous changes, LoGA granted permission for the formation of regional parties and independent candidates to contest in provincial elections. In Indonesia, only the province of Aceh permits local parties to observe local elections. Three times, in 2006, 2012, and 2017, the Aceh election was held since it was crucial to the consolidation of democracy and peace. Indigenous groups and former GAM representatives were welcomed into the political system. Leaders of GAM made the decision to use political tools to fight in the realm of politics.

Local elections in Aceh post-conflict characteristic are the eligibility of independent candidates to run for office. Independent candidates are only required to gather support from a minimum of 3% of the Aceh population, as verified by ID cards. This regulation was initially intended to give time allowance to a candidate from GAM before they established local political parties and used the party ticket to compete. The requirement to run as an independent candidate is slightly easier than the requirement to use the party ticket. Later, independent candidacy is a means of broader participation in elections.

The Aceh society participated heavily in politics in the first municipal election. More than 3,523,774 voters, or more than 80%, participated in the most recent election in Aceh. There are 81,96% voting for the president, 81,88% voting for Indonesia's parliament, and 81,75% voting for Aceh's parliament. Former GAM members now have official access to positions in the legislative and executive branches as members of the Aceh local party. The candidates for governor and vice governor of Aceh with prior GAM experience are listed in the table below.

Table 2: Aceh Candidates with former GAM background

No	Name	Candidates	Former GAM Official
1	Irwandi Yusuf	Governor	AMM Representative
2	Muzakir Manaf	Governor	Defense Minister
3	Zaini Abdullah	Governor	Foreign Minister
4	Sayed Mustafa	Vice Governor	South Aceh Coordinator

As was shown above, integrating the previous independence movement into Aceh's local politics democratically began with the GAM-affiliated candidates' successful participation in the direct elections. The conflict that had emerged within GAM prior to the elections, however, divided the movement's leadership into two primary groups, thus this "win" came at a steep cost. One of these was made up primarily of Malik Mahmud, the former "Prime Minister" of GAM, and the former exile government in Sweden. Former GAM "Minister of Foreign Affairs" Zaini Abdullah, former GAM "Finance Minister" Teuku Lampoh Awe, who passed away in October 2008, Zakaria Saman, and Muzakir Manaf were the most notable individuals in his entourage. The mayor of Sabang, Munawar Liza Zein, the former GAM spokesman, Sofyan Daud, and other recently elected district leaders made up the second faction, which was centered on the newly appointed governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusuf.

Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar won the elections with 38.2% in 2006 in the three Aceh elections that followed the Helsinki MoU. Zaini Abdullah and Muzakir Manaf, candidates for the Aceh local party, won with 55.78% of the vote. With 37.22% of the vote, Irwandi Yusuf and Nova Iriansyah won the election as the Aceh local

party. The local parties in Aceh control 35% of the legislative seats and have twice won the governorship. This result demonstrated that the internal loyalty and structural power of the local GAM support base were both robust. Election-related tension and conflict were only at the campaign stage without government intervention, hence the likelihood of an escalation into open conflict was reduced (Liza, 2021).

Five years after the Helsinki MoU, the peacebuilding in Aceh was in progress to create a structure of peace based on justice, equity, and cooperation from the GOI while accommodating and synchronizing Aceh's aspiration withing the GOI system. The violence that occurred both structurally by the GOI and personally by the army in the field was reduced significantly. Following the MoU in Helsinki, former GAM, researcher, and society appreciated and agreed on various approaches. One of development for political independent in Aceh is local party in Aceh.

Table 3: Political Parties in Aceh Party

No	Party Name	Description of Party
1	Aceh Party	Founded by the leader and some senior of Former GAM represents
2	Aceh Sovereignty Party	Founded by Muslim teacher and students to promote implementation of Shariah Law in Aceh
3	The Aceh People Party	Founded by student activists. Focus on critical stand on foreign investment in Aceh
4	Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party	Founded by Ghalazi Abbas Adan, former Aceh political and artist
5	The Aceh United Party	Founded by national politic actors
6	The Independent Voice of the Acehnese People Party	Founded by former pro-referendum activist Aceh

Source: Hillman (2012)

Major breakthroughs achieved by the Helsinki negotiations included a clear definition of Aceh's special autonomy within the unitary Indonesian Republic. Specifically, these negotiations established provincial and district government authority over all sectors of public affairs (excluding foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice, and religion), and the condition that all decisions on domestic or international

affairs related to Aceh undertaken by the national government or legislature would be made in consultation with and with the consent of the government of Aceh. The governments of Indonesia further committed themselves in the Helsinki MoU to aiding the reintegration of anyone who had taken part in GAM activities as well as civilians impacted by conflict through the development of a reintegration mechanism run by the authorities of Aceh.

All GAM members were given amnesty by the GOI, and those who had given up their Indonesian citizenship may now do so. The GOI granted amnesty to all GAM participants, and more than 2,000 political prisoners were released. Numerous ex-combatants, captives, and refugees made their way back to their hometowns. Aceh was immediately at peace. The task of AMM proved to be easier than expected. Each month, there were less violent incidents and fatalities than in most other Indonesian provinces. Figure shows Aceh five years after the MoU in Helsinki.




Figure 2: Violent Incidents and Deaths by Month

Source: World Bank (2009)

Third-party involvement in peacekeeping is necessary to preserve the absence of direct violence and keep warring parties apart. Making sure that the peace deal is still on track to rebuild New Aceh after the earthquake, tsunami, and conflict is crucial for Aceh at this stage. It will be able to form an external monitoring team in Aceh, but not a foreign peacekeeping force. Both sides concur to establish the EU-managed Aceh Monitoring Mission as a peacekeeping force, which went into effect on September 15, 2005, and lasted for six months. The election and LOGA as key events, it was subsequently extended until December 2006, and work to monitor the local and GOIs' policies continued until 2012. Aceh has been divided by the transition and normalization processes over the previous 15 years. Political participation, violence reduction, recognition of inclusive identity, and stronger law enforcement and economic support are all already in place. As society desires, some flexibility in legislation or ad hoc institutions will be developed during the transition period. During the normalization phase, stronger peace institutions and policies were established to ensure future peacebuilding. The transition to the normalization phase of peacebuilding in Aceh has several features: human rights and justice.

GAM and Aceh Politics

For the last five years, the birth momentum of GAM (4 December) and signing of Helsinki MoU (15 August) have been contentious because some former GAM raised their flag during the ceremony. On 15 August 2020, the GAM flag flew for 1 hour in front of Aceh Party Office in Banda Aceh. Hundreds of former GAM cadres

raised their flag in front of Banda Aceh City's Grand Mosque Baiturahman. According to the former GAM opinion, the GAM flag is legally owned by Qanun due to a LOGA mandate. Otherwise, GOI police replied by removing the GAM flag. They said that because Qanun was changed by the GOI and not in compliance with official regulations, flag-raising constitutes an act of treason (Winardy, 2021). Until now, the GAM flag has been a status quo and a source of contention in Aceh.

Since the MoU in Helsinki, Aceh has held three elections. The new political Aceh Party give access to the former GAM, who occupied various prestigious and strategic political and social positions and won many lucrative contracts during the post-conflict reconstruction process in the province. The new emerging circle of power and the social structure in the province have given rise to internal antagonism and social conflict. In particular, the establishment of the Aceh Party by the former GAM is specifically viewed as also having produced conflict among former GAM members in the party. Conflict in post-Helsinki Aceh follows three common patterns. The first pattern is related to the economic competition and political contestation among the former GAM elites. The second one involves antagonism and anger between former GAM combatants and elites. The third pattern involves ethnic hostility between the dominant Aceh ethnic group, who were prominent supporters of GAM, and the diverse non-Aceh ethnic groups, who were generally opponents of GAM. (Ansori, 2012). Following the Aceh Party's stunning victory in the provincial election, a new circle of power and wealthy patronage networks has arisen in Aceh, with numerous GAM members entering the

bureaucracy.

Several people expressed concern the new approach would benefit one group's interests at the expense of the broader community. The audit process from independent evaluations once building begins is one of the options for the larger community. It is in everyone's best interests to guarantee that the program's protections are effective. Former GAM had numerous opportunities to create local laws after being elected to executive and parliamentary positions. However, many municipal laws passed are not suitable as expected due to a lack of ability. The LoGA is an umbrella law that governs Aceh's special and autonomous zone. Former GAM combatants in parliament have labeled this rule as a conflict. Many local laws passed are not satisfying as expected due to a lack of competency and a contradiction between national regulations. Furthermore, Government Regulation No. 3 of 2015 declared that the GOI controls practically all authorities in Aceh. This Government Regulation was enacted without the consultation of the Aceh Governor and violates the spirit of the Helsinki MoU. (Liza, 2021).

Unfinished of Special Autonomy

In the first period of 2006, Aceh held local elections in the province and city/regency with special autonomy. Munawar Liza of the National Aceh Party, whose majority members are former GAM, was elected mayor of Sabang City. LOGA, as implemented from the Helsinki MoU, like mangoes in one sack, smell items from outside, although some tasty mangoes were not delivered by the government during his leadership (Liza, 2021).

For example, in Sabang, only one derivative regulation from the LOGA is needed, even though many others are needed. The rule on the Sabang Free Port and Trade Area, mandated by LOGA and Law No. 37 of 2000 regarding the Sabang Free Port, is one that is critically needed (SFP). Special autonomy is generally adopted symbolically and formally in general, although bureaucrats face challenges in its implementation and spirit (Liza, 2022). Leadership and administrative abilities must be developed for GOI and local leaders in Aceh. Understanding of special autonomy is a prerequisite for properly constituted institutions. So far, the administration has just completed their plans and split projects among politicians and officials (Kurniawan, 2021).

Aceh is responsible for the construction and administration of all seaports and airports on its territory for access and transit in MoU Helsinki. Airports and seaports are still run by state-owned enterprises and governed by the GOI. Aceh is geographically located in the Malacca Strait, which serves as an international important commerce route. Sabang free trade is one of the Aceh government's initiatives. Sabang is the most northern location and is in a favorable position to develop as an alternative port in the Malacca Strait. Until now, there has been no policy from the Government of India establishing Sabang as a free trade zone (Liza, 2021).

According to Article 1.3.7 of the Helsinki MoU, Aceh shall have direct and unimpeded access to international countries by sea and air. There has been no follow-up policy from the GOI to recognize this point until today. Aceh residents follow the standard immigration procedure. Local government plans are difficult to implement because of bureaucratic issues stemming from central

and local government civil employees' business-as-usual mindsets. Because there is no relationship between the leader's vision in Aceh, who is elected solely by election, and existing bureaucracy, the spirit of establishing Aceh with the autonomous region is not reflected in local government programs.

During the parliamentary elections, numerous inexperienced politicians were elected to district and provincial legislatures. Although it is hoped that Partai Aceh's strong performance will result in less fractious legislatures than in the past, the combination of patronage and populist politics that swept these candidates into office, as well as their relative inexperience in government, may exacerbate some of the inefficiency that has plagued Aceh's lawmaking.

Wali Nanggroe is a special autonomy institution with the vision of "guardian of the state." According to this interpretation, the figure's authority is greater than the governor's. Many Acehnese regard the Wali Nanggroe as a kind of royal guardian of Aceh, whose position is similar to that of the Acehnese sultanate. Meanwhile, another clause in the Helsinki MoU was purposefully left vague: "the institution of Wali Nanggroe, with all its ceremonial features and rights, will be formed." Some Jakartans see Aceh's desire for the reinstatement of the Wali Nanggroe's position as a declaration of a new "constitutional monarchy" within the Indonesian state, as well as a clear reference to Aceh's long history of resistance to outside rule. This interpretation lends weight to lingering suspicions among national leaders that former GAM members still have grand plan to an independent Aceh.

There are several chances and challenges, as specified by Qanun No. 9/2013 and LoGA for Wali Nanggroe. Wali Nanggroe had little opportunities as a result of his discovery. It could be applied in school curricula for educational development of LoGA and Qanun. While the obstacles to the implementation of Qanun No. 9/2013 were brought up, there was discussion about the existence and institutional standing of the Wali Nanggroe institution. Even though the Qanun of the Wali Nanggroe rated communities disagreed with the Aceh Governor's stance as the highest leader in Aceh province when adhering to Government Republic of Indonesia legislation. Following the Helsinki MoU, GAM's master plan is to shift movement from combatants to control of the parliament and government. It would have had a better chance to develop local laws in the previous 15 years. The former GAM combatants, on the other hand, play no role in the national constitution-building process (Liza, 2021).

Local political parties are not involved in electing the national parliament. Several GAM combatants have attempted to be elected to the national parliament through national parties, but many were unsuccessful. As a result, the channel of communication between Jakarta and Aceh is yet to be effectively and properly built to harmonize Aceh policy with national regulation. Local policy of Aceh are in many ways run by themselves, seems like special autonomy. Nonetheless, Aceh people must strengthen their political capacity, not only for elections but also for good governance. Alignment with rules and regulations implemented by the GOI is also essential for Aceh.

Conclusion and Discussion

The New Aceh has already happened right now after the 30 year-conflict with the Indonesian army. More than 5.3 billion of Aceh people can engage in productive activities, with residents returning to the fields and gardens they were forced to abandon during the conflict. People can move about freely, enjoying access to markets, towns, and services they have been denied for a generation. Aceh peacebuilding is intriguing given its durability and the primary stakeholder commitment from the national government. Aceh represents a unique case, planned, and supervised by a national government and executed through the collaboration between national and local governments where the peace settlement was mediated by an international third party, assisted by a short-term peacekeeping mission (Aceh Monitoring Mission) and implemented to fit in with GOI.

In this study, the development of peace settlement is split into three parts of peacebuilding (social, political, and economic) and peacebuilding strategies that encourage participation or the establishment of strong institutions. Some of the key goals are already addressed in the Helsinki MoU. Three levels of leaders have already joined forces to contribute to Aceh's peacebuilding efforts. Since the transition to peace, intermediary players have continuously monitored the Aceh peace deal and assisted in the establishment of local institutions. Leadership is also committed to ensuring that post-war implementation and recovery are carried out throughout the Aceh region.

The most significant benefit of the peace agreement has been the peace itself. People can resume economic activities that

were virtually impossible during the conflict years, as well as enjoy mobility and assembly freedom for the first time in decades. Peacebuilding in Aceh is not a straightforward process or endeavor. Following peacebuilding, future impediments to peace will be encountered.

Recommendations

The unfinished Helsinki MoU and potential conflict in social, political, and economic aspects must be solved by the government. The Aceh symbol, reconciliation of conflict victim, and allocate support for suitable farming land, employment, and social security are still unfinished agendas from the Helsinki MoU. In addition, poverty is still a problem in the middle of a corruption case in the Aceh Government. As a political leader in Aceh, the local party and former GAM have a vital issue of policy budget distribution. Special Autonomy Fund or (SAF) and the Aceh province in general is the end of SAF funding allocation in 2027. The Aceh government's budget prioritizes just the infrastructure sector and the personnel budget. Other areas, however, are equally vital to Aceh's growth. Furthermore, SAF will be phased out in 2027.

Only the infrastructure sector and the budget for personnel are prioritized in the Aceh government's budget. However, there are other areas that are equally important to Aceh's development. Moreover, SAF will be end in 2027. Currently, the Aceh government still relies on the SAF for more than half of its sources. The Aceh government to consider its strategic plans for allocating SAF budget to sustainable Aceh (Kurniawan, 2021).

Aceh's poverty is a major issue. After 15 years of fighting, Aceh's poverty rate has only returned to pre-conflict levels. Aceh's poverty rate remains higher than that of the surrounding Aceh region and even the average province in Indonesia. So yet, the bulk of Aceh residents are still descended from traditional plantation and agricultural families. Aceh is uninterested in the private sector since there is no strategic growth for industry, investment, and commerce. To preserve peace, Aceh's government must shift its priority not only to the infrastructure sector for budget allocation, but also to alleviating poverty in Aceh.

The attempts to strengthen political institutions, consolidate internal and external security, and restore the economy and security are central to the peacebuilding phase. Aceh's political institutions require special autonomy. Human resource development with an emphasis on good governance is critical to distinguishing Aceh's institutions. Peacebuilding has mostly benefited Aceh elites thus far, which is crucial for long-term sustainability, but it has yet to appear as an inclusive opportunity for all Aceh people. GAM and Ulama, as key components of the Aceh people, must be open to maximize the potential of each Aceh person in order to establish Aceh with equality for the Aceh people. The local government must have a long-term vision for future growth. As a result, the GOI must continue to help and train the Aceh government and people.

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