Sanctions Under The Social Security Act For Employers

Abstract

          This academic article aims to study the limitations hindering the effective enforcement of the Social Security Act, B.E. 2533 (1990), specifically regarding the sanctions imposed on employers. The study finds that current statutory sanctions are excessively low, failing to serve as an effective deterrent against economic offenses. This leads employers to perceive fines merely as a cost of doing business, which they are willing to incur in exchange for non-compliance. Furthermore, a significant issue arises where employers deliberately submit required documents but withhold actual payments to circumvent criminal liability, as the law lacks direct criminal sanctions for outstanding contributions. Meanwhile, the imposition of sanctions on legal entities faces constraints due to low fine ceilings and evidentiary hurdles in proving the liability of authorized persons. Additionally, the exercise of discretionary power by officials in settling fines without clear standardized criteria undermines public confidence in the justice system and creates competitive inequality. Consequently, it is recommended that the sanction rates be revised to align with current economic conditions, more stringent administrative measures be introduced to regulate employer behavior, and clear guidelines for fine settlements be established to preserve the sanctity of legal sanctions and ensure the genuine stability of the Social Security Fund.